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Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When Conservative 
Plaintiffs Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine 
HEATHER ELLIOTT* 
The Supreme Court’s Article III standing doctrine has plagued liberal groups 
for nearly forty years. Recently, however, the doctrine has blocked a number of 
conservative lawsuits opposing gay marriage, the 2010 health care law, and the 
expansion of federal funding for stem cell research.  
What can we learn from these cases? Because contemporary criticisms of 
standing doctrine have usually come from the left and defenses from the right, it is 
commonplace to associate arguments for broad standing with left-wing political 
agendas. But, as some scholars have shown, a version of narrow standing helped 
liberals protect New Deal legislation in the 1930s and 1940s. Perhaps, if the 
doctrine keeps both liberals and conservatives out of court, liberals will find less to 
criticize in the doctrine. 
But if one truly believes that the federal courts should be open to more plaintiffs, 
one should see that these cases present a strange-bedfellows moment that might 
persuade a majority of the Court to alter existing standing doctrine. Liberal 
members of the Court generally advocate for a more expansive doctrine of 
standing; conservative members of the Court usually support restrictive standing 
doctrine, but their interest in reaching the merits of certain cases may lead them to 
agree to certain reforms. In this Article I address that prospect as well as the 
possibility that Congress might enact legislation to force the standing question.  
If the Court seizes the opportunity to reform standing doctrine, what are its 
options? Will changes to the doctrine affect all plaintiffs? Or are these recent 
examples of conservative impact litigation different in kind from the cases that 
generated current standing doctrine? In answering these questions, I review recent 
suggestions for amending the doctrine. I conclude that these new conservative 
cases are lamentably unlikely to lead to much change in the law of standing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Article III standing doctrine is the bane of environmental and civil rights 
attorneys.1 Plaintiffs in federal court must satisfy Article III by showing an injury in 
fact, fairly traceable to the defendant, and redressable by the remedy sought.2 The 
standing of those directly regulated by government action—most often businesses—
is usually obvious,3 but those who benefit from regulation—by breathing less 
pollution or competing for integrated housing, for example—have a harder time 
showing standing to sue.4 Thus, standing is often seen as favoring conservative 
interests over liberal5 ones.6 
In a number of recent cases, however, standing doctrine has barred court access 
for conservative plaintiffs in lawsuits challenging gay marriage, the 2010 health 
care law, and the recent expansions in federal funding for stem cell research.7 
Litigators for these conservative causes8 now feel the frustration often felt by liberal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See infra Part I.B. 
 2. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 3. See id. at 561–62.  
 4. See id. at 562. 
 5. I use the term “liberal” despite its current anathematic status, see Roger Cohen, The 
New L-Word: Neocon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at A29 (“A few years back, at the height of 
the jingoistic post-9/11 wave, the dirtiest word in the American political lexicon was 
‘liberal.’”), and despite the term’s older links to libertarian political thought. See, e.g., 
ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY (2002); see also Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and 
the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1454 (1988) (“A basic tenet of 
liberalism is the primacy of the individual as the focus of the political and moral world.” 
(citation omitted) (citing ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975))). I also 
acknowledge that neat lines cannot be drawn between “conservatives” and “liberals” on 
many issues. See, e.g., infra note 56. 
 6. See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury 
Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 324–30 (2002) (recounting abuse of standing doctrine to, for 
example, help white plaintiffs and wealthy plaintiffs and to harm black plaintiffs, indigent 
plaintiffs, and imprisoned plaintiffs). 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. Conservatives continue to use the full panoply of political and legal tools. See, e.g., 
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litigators: standing doctrine has barred the federal courthouse door to right-wing 
impact litigation,9 just as it has so often for the left.10 
What can we learn from these cases? Arguments to broaden standing are 
generally made by those on the left; such critics wish to ensure that the courts can 
enforce laws against, for example, environmental degradation and racial and gender 
discrimination.11 But would these critics want a broader standing doctrine if that 
doctrine enlisted the courts in enforcing laws against gay marriage12 or in 
preventing stem cell research on pro-life grounds?13 Perhaps instead these cases 
support a liberal argument for the current restrictive standing doctrine. As some 
scholars have shown, standing doctrine served liberal purposes in the New Deal and 
its immediate aftermath.14 These new cases may suggest that the doctrine can play a 
liberal role again by closing the door of the courts to conservative plaintiffs (and 
thus preventing judgments for those plaintiffs on the merits).  
But given the ample and convincing criticisms of current standing doctrine,15 
perhaps the better view is that these new cases present an opportunity for reform. 
Members of the Court might form unusual coalitions, with conservatives motivated 
by the merits of these new cases to recognize the need for broadened standing 
doctrine and liberals seizing the moment to implement long-desired changes.16 Will 
the Court take this opportunity? And what will it do? 
                                                                                                                 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & E. Gary Spitko, Navigating Dangerous Constitutional Straits: 
A Prolegomenon on the Federal Marriage Amendment and the Disenfranchisement of 
Sexual Minorities, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 599 (2005). 
 9. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1281, 1311 (1976).  
 10. Impact litigation for conservative causes is not new; the Pacific Legal Foundation 
(PLF), for example, has been filing such lawsuits since 1973. See PACIFIC LEGAL 
FOUNDATION, http://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=262. Nor is the standing issue a 
wholly new one for conservative litigants. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66 (1986) 
(holding that a physician with strong personal feelings but no particular and concrete interest 
in anti-abortion law had no standing to defend the constitutionality of the law, because 
“Article III requires more than a desire to vindicate value interests” (citation omitted)). But 
the emergence of standing as a significant barrier to conservative litigation is new, in part 
because many conservative causes (for PLF, private property rights and free enterprise) fit 
traditional common-law notions of private rights, thus satisfying the standing doctrine more 
easily than do liberal causes such as environmental and consumer protection. See infra Part 
II.  
 11. See infra notes 55–81 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 13. See infra Part II.C. 
 14. See infra Part I.A. 
 15. See infra Part I.B. 
 16. Some are watching closely. See Linda Greenhouse, Who Stands for Standing?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2010, 9:44 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/who-
stands-for-standing/ (“Personally, I can hardly wait to watch Chief Justice John G. Roberts, 
Jr., and his allies, for whom raising the barriers to standing is a core part of their agenda, 
figure out how to respond when one of the new issues reaches the Supreme Court.”); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Who Has Standing to Appeal Prop. 8 Ruling?, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/15/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky-gay-marriage-20100815 
(“Ironically, it is a legal doctrine fashioned by conservatives that may provide a decisive 
victory to the supporters of marriage equality for gays and lesbians and end the litigation 
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A decision to grant certiorari in the gay marriage, stem cell, or health care cases 
would give the Court not only the responsibility of addressing standing doctrine but 
also (if standing is found) of resolving the merits of the underlying case.17 Justice 
Kennedy is the swing vote on both the standing and merits issues of all these cases, 
and his position is difficult to predict.18 Although it takes only four Justices to grant 
certiorari,19 serious doubt about the fifth vote on the merits20 may well convince 
both the liberal and the conservative justices to leave the merits—and hence 
necessarily a grant of broader standing—for later.  
Congress may try to force the issue by enacting statutes that purport to confer 
standing on particular plaintiffs or groups.21 Under current Supreme Court doctrine, 
Congress cannot grant standing exceeding the bounds of Article III,22 but it can, 
within those bounds, open the courthouse doors more widely.23 It can also, of 
course, pass statutes that it knows do not comport with the Court’s current 
interpretation of Article III, hoping to nudge the Court along.24 Such political 
support might make the Court more willing to confront long-noted problems with 
the standing doctrine. 
If the Court decides to revisit the doctrine, what might it do? I take the 
opportunity these recent cases offer to review new suggestions for altering standing 
                                                                                                                 
over California’s Proposition 8.”). 
  As I discuss below, see infra Part III.A., my argument need not rely on the members 
of the Court engaging in naked political calculation rather than thoughtful doctrinal 
modification. It is quite consistent with good judicial practice to change one’s mind when 
faced with the far-reaching consequences of earlier decisions.  
 17. As I discuss below, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 14, 2011 in 
the only pending health-care case in which standing has been conceded by all parties. See 
infra Part II.B. 
 18. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, When It Matters Most, It Is Still the Kennedy Court, 
11 GREEN BAG 2D 427 (2008); Kenneth M. Murchison, Four Terms of the Kennedy Court: 
Projecting the Future of Constitutional Doctrine, 39 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 19. The “Rule of Four” is nowhere codified, but it is the current and longstanding 
practice of the Court that only four justices need vote to grant certiorari. EUGENE GRESSMAN, 
KENNETH S. GELLER, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, TIMOTHY S. BISHOP & EDWARD A. HARTNETT, 
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 327 (9th ed. 2007). 
 20. A simple majority of justices sitting on a case is required for a Supreme Court 
opinion to have precedential value; recusals may affect both the denominator and the 
numerator of the simple majority. Id. at 5–6. An equally divided Court never creates 
precedent. Id. at 6.  
 21. See, e.g., Discussion Draft, American Clean Energy & Security Act of 2009, H.R. 
2454, 111th Cong. § 336(a) (2009), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house. 
gov/Press_111/20090331/acesa_ discussiondraft.pdf (draft bill, never adopted in this form, 
providing broadened standing for climate-change issues). 
 22. See Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 159, 182–94 (2011). 
 23. Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de 
facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (emphasis in original). 
 24. Congress already enacts statutes that are unconstitutional, with the comfortable 
knowledge that the courts provide a backstop. See Mark Tushnet, Some Notes on 
Congressional Capacity to Interpret the Constitution, 89 B.U. L. REV. 499, 504 (2009). 
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doctrine. For example, Robert Pushaw, a noted scholar of the federal courts,25 has 
recently published an intriguing article on standing doctrine. He suggests limiting 
standing in certain contexts to those who can show they were accidentally exposed 
to the action they challenge (thus barring plaintiffs who intentionally create an 
“injury in fact” in order to establish the right to sue).26 Jonathan Remy Nash has 
suggested importing the precautionary principle—an oft-cited principle of 
international law—into standing decisions on certain issues.27 The emergence of 
standing as an issue for conservative litigants offers a new perspective from which 
to evaluate such suggestions.  
I then turn more generally to the tripartite standing test of injury in fact, 
causation, and redressability and ask how the Court might use these conservative 
standing cases to effect specific changes. I conclude that the problems faced by 
conservative litigants are sufficiently similar to those faced by liberals that the 
solution for both is the same: the Court should abandon its strict constitutional 
standing doctrine in favor of a prudential doctrine of abstention.28 I also conclude, 
regretfully, that the Court is unlikely to take this step. 
 
*** 
 
This Article is structured as follows. In Part I, I give a brief overview of standing 
doctrine and of its standard criticisms, many of which view the doctrine as a tool 
used by conservative judges to stifle liberal plaintiffs. In Part II, I outline the ways 
in which standing has recently hindered conservative litigation in a variety of 
contexts. I then, in Part III, assess the likelihood that the Court will seize on these 
conservative cases (or on congressional enactments prompted by these cases) to 
reform standing doctrine. I ask in Part IV what that reform might look like.  
I. STANDING AND ITS CRITICS 
In this Part, I review Article III standing doctrine and give a brief overview of 
standing scholarship, much of which has viewed the doctrine as a tool of 
conservative jurists seeking to suppress liberal litigants. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., A Neo-Federalist Analysis of Federal Question 
Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1516–20, 1542–71 (2007); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., 
Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist “Rebuttable 
Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165 (2002); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent 
Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001); 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 
81 CORNELL L. REV. 393 (1996) [hereinafter Pushaw, Justiciability]; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., 
Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1994) [hereinafter Pushaw, Case/Controversy Distinction]. 
 26. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs: 
Lessons from Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 82–105 (2010).  
 27. Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 494, 511–26 (2008). 
 28. See infra Part III.C; see also Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 459, 510–16 (2008). 
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A. The Doctrine 
Standing doctrine is rooted in the “case or controversy” provision of Article 
III.29 Current doctrine requires a plaintiff to show that she has “suffered an injury in 
fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and 
particularized . . . and . . . actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”30 
That injury must also be “fairly traceable” to the defendant, at least in part, and the 
remedy sought must redress the injury to some extent.31 This tripartite test of injury 
in fact, causation, and redressability is the “bedrock requirement” of constitutional 
standing.32 The Court has issued opinions dealing with a variety of special 
circumstances under the constitutional standing doctrine,33 including generalized 
grievances,34 procedural injury,35 informational injury,36 and risk of harm.37 
The standing test arrived at its current tripartite form in 1978,38 the result of 
tightening criteria for Article III standing throughout the 1970s.39 As recently as 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties . . . ;—to 
all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of 
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a 
Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of 
another State;—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State 
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, 
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”).  
 30. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 31. Id. at 560–61. 
 32. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 
454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 538 (2007) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (same). 
 33. Federal courts must also apply a variety of prudential standing doctrines, which 
ensure, for example, that the plaintiff is within the zone of interests of the statute he invokes, 
e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153–57 (1970), and 
that the plaintiff does not raise issues better raised by a third party, see, e.g., Tileston v. 
Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943). 
 34. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975); see 
Kimberly N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized Grievances, 68 MD. L. REV. 221, 265–66 
(2008). 
 35. EPA, 549 U.S. at 516–21. 
 36. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998). For an in-depth discussion of the import of 
Akins, see Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins 
and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 616 (1999). 
 37. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009). 
 38. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978). 
 39. See Pushaw, supra note 26, at 34–43; see also generally Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. 
Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the 
Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 640–47 (2010) (suggesting rise of 
public interest litigation in the 1960s as a reason for tightening of standing doctrine in the 
1970s); Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 
1139–69 (2009) (recounting history of broad standing in the 1940s through the 1960s and 
showing the demise of that broad standing by 1976); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing 
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1962, the Court framed standing using much freer language: “the gist of the 
question of standing” is whether “the appellants [have] alleged such a personal 
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which 
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court . . . depends.”40 But the 
explosion of public-interest litigation in the 1960s, along with changes in the 
Court’s composition, led to increasingly strict standing requirements.41 The Court 
over the same period has made it clear that it sees the tripartite standing test not 
only as assuring “concrete adverseness”42 (necessary for a court to do its job qua 
court), but also as maintaining the separation of powers provided by our 
Constitution’s structure (keeping political issues with the political branches and 
keeping the courts out of legislative versus executive battles).43 
This recent history—of standing as a barrier to (usually liberal) public-interest 
litigation which threatens the constitutional separation of powers—overshadows an 
earlier history, in which standing protected liberal New Deal legislation from the 
pro-business federal courts.44 Professors Ho and Ross have stated that, “[r]ather 
than supporting the conservative goal of keeping broad-based public interest 
litigation out of court, restrictive standing requirements may originally have 
achieved precisely the opposite result: preserving and enshrining the liberal New 
Deal administrative state.”45 As Professor Winter puts it, standing allowed liberal 
justices to “preclude any dissatisfied private citizen from invoking the Constitution 
in the courts to challenge the progressive programs enacted by the polity” during 
the New Deal.46 
                                                                                                                 
After Lujan? of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 193–97 
(1992) (choosing 1975 as date that current restrictive standing doctrine started to emerge). 
For an analysis linking standing to much earlier efforts at docket control, see Pushaw, supra 
note 26, at 17 n.61. 
 40. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).  
 41. Pushaw, supra note 26, at 34 (“The [Court’s] emerging conservative majority 
reduced the impact of cases recognizing novel constitutional rights, refrained from creating 
any new such rights, and construed liberal statutes narrowly. Most importantly, the Court 
blunted the force of federal laws by making it harder to sue to enforce them. Specifically, the 
Court began to apply the injury-in-fact requirement more stringently and erected two new 
Article III hurdles, causation and redressability.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 42. Baker, 369 U.S. at 204. 
 43. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[S]tanding is built on a single basic 
idea—the idea of separation of powers.”); see Elliott, supra note 28, at 469–74, 475–83, 
493–96. Standing is, however, a poor tool for these separation-of-powers functions. See id. 
at 474–75, 483–92, 497–500. 
 44. See Ho & Ross, supra note 39, at 639–44; Sunstein, supra note 39, at 179–81; 
Winter, supra note 5, at 1456–57. 
 45. Ho & Ross, supra note 39, at 595. Note, however, that Ho and Ross disagree with 
Sunstein and Winter about the reasons standing doctrine emerged in this period: while 
Sunstein and Winter contend that the doctrine was invented by liberal justices in order to 
protect the administrative state during the New Deal, Ho and Ross suggest instead that the 
standing doctrine emerged originally as a means of docket control and was then seized on as 
a convenient existing tool during the New Deal. Compare Ho & Ross, supra note 39, at 
634–38, with Sunstein, supra note 39, at 179–80, and Winter, supra note 5, at 1374. 
 46. Winter, supra note 5, at 1457; see also Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 25, at 
458–59 (“[Justice] Brandeis’s disciple Felix Frankfurter, who became a Justice in 1939, led 
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B. Standing’s Effects on Liberal Impact Litigation 
Article III standing doctrine has been criticized extensively. It has been called 
“incoherent,”47 “manipulable,”48 “doctrinal[ly] confus[ed],”49 a “word game played 
by secret rules,”50 and “one of ‘the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain 
of public law.’”51 Critics say that it “reduc[es] the permissible role of Congress in 
government policymaking,”52 permits courts to decide the merits by pretending 
instead to decide a threshold jurisdictional question,53 and amounts to Lochner-style 
substantive due process.54  
                                                                                                                 
a rapidly emerging majority of FDR appointees in fostering the New Deal by minimizing 
judicial interference with the political departments through the justiciability doctrines. For 
example, the Court embraced the Brandeisian strategy of invoking justiciability to shield 
progressive legislation from conservative substantive due process challenges.”). But see 
Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
309 (1995). 
 47. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 221–23 (1988) 
(describing the doctrine as “incoherent”); Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 73, 75 (2007) (describing standing and other justiciability doctrines as 
“pointless constraint[s] on courts”); see Winter, supra note 5, at 1418–25 (describing 
doctrine as lacking a historical foundation). 
 48. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1432, 1458 (1988). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 99 (majority opinion) (quoting Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on 
Const. Rts. of the S. Jud. Comm., 89th Cong. 498 (1966) (statement of Professor Paul A. 
Freund)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 94 (noting that the Case or 
Controversy provision of Article III has “an iceberg quality, containing beneath [its] surface 
simplicity submerged complexities”). 
 52. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially 
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1170 (1993) (emphasis omitted); 
see also id. at 1201 (calling Lujan part of “the evisceration of the principle of legislative 
supremacy”); David Krinsky, How to Sue Without Standing: The Constitutionality of Citizen 
Suits in Non-Article III Tribunals, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 301, 304 (2007) (Standing 
doctrine “poses a general constraint on Congress’s power to craft enforcement schemes for 
its regulatory programs.”); Nichol, supra note 6, at 305 (contending that the injury-in-fact 
standard “should neither be used to restrict the powers of Congress to authorize jurisdiction, 
nor to [give scope to] the Justices’ own unexamined and unexplained preferences”); 
Sunstein, supra note 39, at 211 (“[T]here is a huge difference between cases reflecting 
judicial reluctance to invoke the Constitution to challenge legislative outcomes and cases in 
which Congress, the national lawmaker, has explicitly created standing so as to ensure 
bureaucratic conformity with democratic will.”). But see Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of 
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 
881 (1983). 
 53. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 
CORNELL L. REV. 663, 663 (1977). 
 54. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 39, at 167 (“[T]he injury-in-fact requirement should 
be counted as a prominent contemporary version of early twentieth-century substantive due 
process.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 48, at 1480 (arguing that a strict view of standing 
produces results much like that of the Lochner era, “when constitutional provisions were 
similarly interpreted so as to frustrate regulatory initiatives in deference to private-law 
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Standing has particularly been criticized by those who see it as a tool used by 
conservative judges to keep left-wing litigants out of court.55 This view has evolved 
in part because many of the cases that produced today’s narrow standing doctrine 
rejected environmental and civil rights plaintiffs on the ground that they lacked 
standing.56  
In Sierra Club v. Morton,57 the Court enunciated the now dominant view of 
standing to protect natural resources such as forests, rivers, and mountains: a 
plaintiff may legitimately claim injury to his aesthetic and environmental interests, 
but that plaintiff must personally use the resource; a group’s general interest in 
environmental protection is insufficient for standing.58 Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife similarly required plaintiffs to show concrete plans to visit and study 
endangered species, rather than more diffuse interests in the species, to justify 
standing to sue and thus enforce the Endangered Species Act.59 Yet, in Bennett v. 
Spear,60 the Court allowed ranchers to sue under the Endangered Species Act 
because economic injury they faced due to potential water rationing clearly satisfied 
Article III.61 Recent cases raise issues about the level of environmental risk that 
suffices for standing.62 
                                                                                                                 
understandings of the legal system”); Fletcher, supra note 47, at 233 (“[O]ne may even say 
that the ‘injury in fact’ test is a form of substantive due process.”). But see Ann Woolhandler 
& Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 467–69 (1995) (arguing that 
Sunstein’s view of the Lochner era ignores important changes that were taking place in 
standing for state governments as litigators). 
 55. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: 
Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 62 (2008) (“The door to 
the Supreme Court is held open by the Constitution; Congress, in turn, is to a large extent 
keeper of the keys to the lower federal courts. In the past half century, however, the courts 
have increasingly taken it upon themselves to close their doors to parties and complaints that 
they consider unsuitable for judicial resolution. One of the chief ways of petitioning for 
redress is through cases brought in our courts. Principal among the tools we use in violation 
of the constitutional promise of the right to petition is the doctrine of standing.” (footnotes 
omitted)). Standing doctrine has also been criticized from the right. See, e.g., Pushaw, 
Justiciability, supra note 25, at 467–72. 
 56. Some do not see the doctrine as so lopsided. See Pushaw, supra note 26, at 4 
(“Liberal Justices have adopted a relaxed approach to maximize access for plaintiffs seeking 
to vindicate progressive laws, whereas conservatives have strictly enforced standing rules to 
keep out ACLU types but have loosened the reins for businesses and other favored 
plaintiffs.”). Moreover, left-wing groups do not have a monopoly on such issues. See, e.g., 
John Copeland Nagle, The Evangelical Debate over Climate Change, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 
53 (2008); Lucia A. Silecchia, Environmental Ethics from the Perspectives of NEPA and 
Catholic Social Teaching: Ecological Guidance for the 21st Century, 28 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 659 (2004). 
 57. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
 58. Silecchia, supra note 56, at 734–40. 
 59. 504 U.S. 555, 562–67 (1992). 
 60. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
 61. See id. at 161–79. Economic injury from water rationing clearly satisfies Article III 
injury; I highlight Bennett as a case that caused consternation among environmental 
public-interest groups, especially in contrast with Lujan. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, 
Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of Interests and Article III Standing Analysis 
After Bennett v. Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763, 788–89 (1997); Sam Kalen, Standing on Its 
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Standing has also been problematic in civil rights cases. Allen v. Wright63 
involved a suit over the IRS’s failure to enforce nondiscrimination regulations 
against segregated private schools.64 The plaintiffs contended that the IRS’s 
inaction caused a direct injury to the plaintiffs’ dignity: the IRS was not taking 
racial discrimination seriously, and the plaintiffs were injured thereby.65 But the 
Court held that the claimed dignitary injury was insufficient to satisfy standing’s 
injury-in-fact requirement: the claimed injury was either a generalized grievance—
“an asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law”66—or an 
“abstract stigmatic injury.”67 The Court also stopped left-wing impact litigation by 
invoking causation and redressability problems in Warth v. Seldin,68 Simon v. 
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,69 and Linda R. S. v. Richard D.70 
Professor Nichol has argued that, in general, standing doctrine “systematically 
                                                                                                                 
Last Legs: Bennett v. Spear and the Past and Future of Standing in Environmental Cases, 
13 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (1997). 
 62. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009); Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000). For useful discussions 
of the debate over probabilistic injury, see generally Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? 
The Dangers of Imposing a Standing Threshold, 97 GEO. L.J. 391 (2009); Bradford Mank, 
Standing and Statistical Persons: A Risk-Based Approach to Standing, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
665 (2009); Cassandra Sturkie & Suzanne Logan, Further Developments in the D.C. 
Circuit’s Article III Standing Analysis: Are Environmental Cases Safe from the Court's 
Deepening Skepticism of Increased-Risk-of-Harm Claims?, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,460 
(2008); Cassandra Sturkie & Nathan H. Selzer, Developments in the D.C. Circuit’s Article 
III Standing Analysis: When Is an Increased Risk of Future Harm Sufficient to Constitute 
Injury-in-Fact in Environmental Cases?, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,287 (2007). 
 63. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
 64. See id. at 739–40. 
 65. See id. at 753–54. 
 66. Id. at 754. 
 67. Id. at 755. 
 68. 422 U.S. 490, 506–07 (1975) (holding that, in a case challenging allegedly 
discriminatory land use practices in the town of Penfield, “the facts alleged fail to support an 
actionable causal relationship between Penfield’s zoning practices and [the] asserted injury” 
of individual plaintiffs; their situations suggest that their “inability to reside in Penfield is the 
consequence of the economics of the area housing market, rather than of respondent’s 
assertedly illegal acts”; also denying standing to a variety of housing organizations who 
sought to be plaintiffs). 
 69. 426 U.S. 26, 42–43 (1976) (holding, in a case challenging a charitable tax 
exemption for a hospital that did not serve the poor, that even if the IRS enforced 
requirements for the tax exemption, it was merely speculative that the hospital would then 
provide the plaintiffs with the health care they sought; the hospital might choose instead to 
forgo charity status). 
 70. 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973) (noting that in a case involving a challenge by the mother 
of an illegitimate child to the prosecutor’s policy of prosecuting men for nonpayment of 
child support only when parents of the child had been married, holding that the mother had a 
cognizable injury due to nonpayment of child support, but further holding that her injury 
would not be redressed even if she won her case seeking even-handed prosecution: “if 
appellant were granted the requested relief, it would result only in the jailing of the child’s 
father. The prospect that prosecution will, at least in the future, result in payment of support 
can, at best, be termed only speculative.”). 
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favors the powerful over the powerless.”71 In other words, “the power to trigger 
judicial review is afforded most readily to those who have traditionally enjoyed the 
greatest access to the processes of democratic government.”72 On Nichol’s analysis, 
whites have easier access to federal courts than do blacks in the race discrimination 
context (particularly in voting cases); men have easier access than do women in the 
sex discrimination context; and the privileged generally have easier access than do 
the underprivileged.73 
Standing doctrine also builds in an asymmetry in access much lamented by 
liberal commentators. In Lujan, the Supreme Court stated that its Article III 
standing doctrine gives certain categories of plaintiffs easier access to the federal 
courts than other categories. When “the plaintiff is himself an object of the action 
(or forgone action) at issue. . . . there is ordinarily little question that” he has 
standing.74 When, however, “the plaintiff is not himself the object of the 
government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is 
ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”75 The doctrine thus permits 
suits by regulated entities (companies or individuals whose activities will be limited 
by government regulation) more easily than it permits suits by regulatory 
beneficiaries (those who will benefit from the restrictions imposed by government 
regulation).  
This asymmetry in standing has received some attention.76 Professor Pierce, for 
example, focuses on the effects that this asymmetry has inside regulatory agencies.77 
If an agency knows it can be sued, he points out, it has an incentive to avoid the 
activity that will prompt a lawsuit.78 Given that standing doctrine makes it harder 
                                                                                                                 
 
 71. Nichol, supra note 6, at 304; see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, 
and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141, 1168 (1993) (“Justice Scalia’s view of 
separation of powers threatens to constitutionalize an unbalanced scheme of regulatory 
review. . . . The courts can protect the interests of regulated entities, but the interests of 
‘regulatory beneficiaries’ are left to the political process.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 72. Nichol, supra note 6, at 333. 
 73. See id. at 322–29. Justice Douglas raised a similar concern when he dissented in 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 229 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). In preventing citizens from challenging certain actions under the Incompatibility 
Clause, Justice Douglas argued that the standing doctrine 
protects the status quo by reducing the challenges that may be made to it and to 
its institutions. It greatly restricts the classes of persons who may challenge 
administrative action. Its application in this case serves to make the 
bureaucracy of the Pentagon more and more immune from the protests of 
citizens. 
Id. 
 74. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992). 
 75. Id. at 562 (citation omitted). 
 76. See Elliott, supra note 22, at 172–74; Elliott, supra note 28, at 466–67; Fletcher, 
supra note 47, at 222; Nichol, supra note 6, at 305; Pierce, supra note 52, at 1177–82; 
Sunstein, supra note 36, at 167–68; Tushnet, supra note 53, at 663. 
 77. See Pierce, supra note 52, at 1194–95. 
 78. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 52, at 1194–95; Sunstein, supra note 36, at 219–20; see 
also F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
275, 327 (2008) (noting value of lawsuits in deterring undesirable private conduct). 
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for regulatory beneficiaries to get into court, the agencies will try to please those 
who can sue: the regulated industry.79 This, in turn, will facilitate the “capture” of 
agencies by regulated industry;80 such “‘capture’ is a version of the phenomenon the 
Framers called ‘factionalism.’ [Standing doctrine thus may] maximiz[e] the 
potential growth of the political pathology the Framers most feared and strived to 
minimize.”81 
In general, then, the critics of standing tend to be liberals who lament the high 
hurdles imposed on plaintiffs who seek to protect the environment, vindicate civil 
rights, and the like. But recent cases demonstrate that liberal plaintiffs are not the 
only ones restricted by standing doctrine. Those cases are the subject of the next 
Part. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. Pierce, supra note 52, at 1194–95; see also Philip Weinberg, Unbarring the Bar of 
Justice: Standing in Environmental Suits and the Constitution, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 27, 
45 (2003) (comparing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), 
which rejected the plaintiffs’ standing and which “rests on a narrow, grudging, indeed 
hostile, reading of Congress’s citizen-suit provisions,” with Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 
(1997), which found standing for ranchers under the Endangered Species Act even though 
their victory would harm protected species and which may be “a manifestation of greater 
concern for business interests alleging economic harm from government”). The asymmetry 
extends to decisions, not just about standing, but also about the availability of judicial 
review. See Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 553, 661 (1985) (“The Court’s decisions reflect skepticism about the 
appropriateness of judicial supervision of the regulatory process at the behest of statutory 
beneficiaries.”). But see A.H. Barnett & Timothy D. Terrell, Economic Observations on 
Citizen-Suit Provisions of Environmental Legislation, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 
(2001) (contending that it is environmental groups that have the advantage, given generous 
citizen suit provisions and broad availability of standing).  
 80. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through 
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010) (explaining that capture is the process by 
which “well-financed and politically influential special interests” overwhelm “the diffuse 
interest of the general public” and obtain special treatment by agencies); id. at 21 n.23 
(collecting citations on the literature of capture). For the classic description of such capture, 
see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 127 (2d ed. 1971) (“Since relatively small groups will frequently be able voluntarily 
to organize and act in support of their common interests, and since large groups normally 
will not be able to do so, the outcome of the political struggle among the various groups in 
society will not be symmetrical. . . . [S]mall ‘special interest’ groups, the ‘vested interests,’ 
have disproportionate power.”); id. at 144 (“Often a relatively small group or industry will 
win a tariff, or a tax loophole, at the expense of millions of consumers or taxpayers in spite 
of the ostensible rule of the majority.”). 
 81. Pierce, supra note 52, at 1195 (footnote omitted); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. 727, 745–46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The suggestion that Congress can 
stop action which is undesirable is true in theory; yet even Congress is too remote to give 
meaningful direction and its machinery is too ponderous to use very often. The federal 
agencies of which I speak are not venal or corrupt. But they are notoriously under the control 
of powerful interests who manipulate them through advisory committees, or friendly 
working relations, or who have that natural affinity with the agency which in time develops 
between the regulator and the regulated.”). 
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II. STANDING AS A BAR TO CONSERVATIVE PLAINTIFFS 
In this Part, I outline the ways in which standing has hindered conservative 
litigation in cases challenging California’s ban on gay marriage, challenging the 
constitutionality of the recently enacted health care law, and challenging changes to 
the federal stem-cell research program.82  
A. Gay Rights 
A number of state courts have used standing doctrine akin to that under Article 
III to dismiss conservative lawsuits brought to limit gay rights.83 The standing issue 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. Cases have arisen in a variety of other areas, in which standing has been denied to 
conservative plaintiffs. See, e.g., Glenn v. Holder, 738 F. Supp. 2d 718, 731 (E.D. Mich. 
2010) (holding that pastors lacked standing to challenge the criminal provisions of the 
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, which added sexuality as 
a protected category); Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 521 F. 3d 602, 610–11 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(finding that a student opposed to homosexuality on religious grounds lacked standing to 
challenge school board’s ban on making stigmatizing comments about other students’ sexual 
orientation); Daubenmire v. City of Columbus, 452 F. Supp. 2d 794, 812 (S.D. Ohio 2006) 
(holding that plaintiffs who burned gay-pride flags to protest homosexuality lacked standing 
to seek injunctive relief against city); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F. 3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(holding that plaintiffs who preached against homosexuality on university campus lacked 
standing to challenge permit requirement imposed by university, when they had never even 
applied for the permit). 
 83. Helgeland v. Wisconsin Municipalities, 745 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 2008) (denying 
municipalities intervention in suit brought by lesbians seeking same-sex benefits for their 
partners); Brinkman v. Miami Univ., No. CA2006-12-313, 2007 WL 2410390 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Aug. 27, 2007) (finding standing lacking for conservatives who sought to prevent 
public employer from providing benefits to same-sex partners of public employees); William 
B. Turner, Chasing Queers: The Radicalism of Conservative Attacks on Lesbians and Gay 
Men (May 2008) (unpublished manuscript)  (http://works.bepress.com/william_turner/10/) 
(discussing Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Woodbury Cnty, 698 N.W.2d 858 (Iowa 2005), 
which found standing lacking for conservatives who sought to prevent a lesbian couple, who 
had entered into a civil union in Vermont, from divorcing in Iowa); see also John Schwartz, 
When Same-Sex Marriages End, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2011, at SR3 (describing efforts of the 
Texas Attorney General to intervene in two divorces involving gay couples married in states 
where gay marriage is legal, on the ground that Texas recognizes neither gay marriage nor 
gay divorce). 
  A fascinating example is Rohde v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, 737 N.W.2d 158 
(Mich. 2007), in which the Michigan Supreme Court initially found standing lacking for 
conservatives who sought to prevent a public employer from providing benefits to same-sex 
partners of public employees. Rohde, 737 N.W.2d at 167. Rohde was overruled by Lansing 
Schools Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686 (2010), when the Michigan 
Supreme Court recognized that federal standing doctrine had led it astray: cases like Rohde  
dramatically distorted Michigan jurisprudence to invent out of whole cloth a 
constitutional basis for the standing doctrine and then, perplexingly, 
determined that Michigan’s standing doctrine should be essentially 
coterminous with the federal doctrine, despite the significant differences 
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has emerged most forcefully, however, in federal lawsuits challenging federal and 
state bans on gay marriage.84 
1. California’s Gay-Marriage Ban 
On November 4, 2008, slightly more than 52% of voters voted yes85 on 
Proposition 8 (“Prop 8”), thus amending the California Constitution with the 
following language: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or 
recognized in California.”86 That provision became effective the next day.87 
State-court challenges to this gay-marriage ban, alleging conflicts with the 
California Constitution, failed.88 
On May 22, 2009, two gay couples (Kristin Perry and Sandra Stier, and Paul 
Katami and Jeffrey J. Zarrillo) sued then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
then-Attorney General Jerry Brown,89 and several other California officials in 
                                                                                                                 
between the two constitutions and the powers held by the respective court 
systems. 
Id. at 692. Under the historical Michigan approach, good law again after Lansing Schools, 
courts apply a prudential (and not constitutional) analysis to determine whether plaintiffs 
should be able to proceed. Id. at 699. 
 84. See California Supreme Court to Decide Issue in Same-Sex Marriage Ban Case, 
CNN ( Feb. 17, 2011, 8:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/02/16/ 
california.proposition.8/ index.html?iref=allsearch; Peter Henderson & Dan Levine, Gay 
Marriage Case Back in California Court, Adds Delay, REUTERS ( Feb. 16, 2011, 6:50 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/16/us-usa-gaymarriage-california-
idUSTRE71F7UY20110216; Ashby Jones, With Latest Ruling, Prop. 8 Case Now Officially 
on Slow Track, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG ( Feb. 16, 2011, 6:12 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/02/16/with-latest-ruling-prop-8-case-now-officially-on-slow-
track/;  see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Gay and the Angry: The Supreme Court and the 
Battles Surrounding Same-Sex Marriage, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 159 (2011). 
 85. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: 2008 GENERAL ELECTION 7 (2008) 
[hereinafter STATEMENT OF VOTE], available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/ 
2008_general/sov_complete.pdf. 
 86. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS 128 
(2008), available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-
of-proposed-laws.pdf#prop8. Voters had previously enacted Proposition 22, which amended 
the California Family Code to ban gay marriage. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL 
DECLARATION OF THE RESULT OF THE PRIMARY ELECTION HELD ON TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 2000, 
THROUGHOUT THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ON STATEWIDE MEASURES SUBMITTED TO A VOTE OF 
ELECTORS x (2000), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2000_primary/ 
dec_measures.pdf. The California Supreme Court held that the statute created by Proposition 
22 violated the California Constitution. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 
2008), invalidated by 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 87. STATEMENT OF VOTE, supra note 85, at 6–7 (“An initiative . . . approved by a 
majority of votes thereon takes effect the day after the election.” (citing CAL. CONST. art. II, 
§ 10)). 
 88. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 89. Brown has now replaced Schwarzenegger as the Governor of California, and 
Kamala Harris is now the Attorney General of California. Jack Chang, Kamala Harris Asks 
Court to Let Gay Marriages Resume, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 2, 2011, at 4, available at 
2011 WLNR 4036602. 
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federal court.90 The couples contended that the gay-marriage ban instituted by Prop 
8 violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal 
Constitution;91 superstar Supreme Court litigators Theodore Olson and David Boies 
appeared for the plaintiffs in the district court.92 
Schwarzenegger, Brown, and the other government defendants refused to defend 
the ban—indeed, Brown conceded that the ban was unconstitutional93—but 
remained in the case as parties; the district court then allowed those who had 
promoted the Prop 8 initiative itself (“Proponents”) to intervene to defend it.94 After 
a lengthy trial, the district court ruled that California’s ban on gay marriage denied 
the gay couples due process and equal protection under the Federal Constitution 
and enjoined the ban’s enforcement.95 
The plaintiffs had no Article III standing problems. They were injured in fact by 
California’s initiative-imposed barrier to their marriages; their injury would be 
redressed by a judgment declaring the gay-marriage ban unconstitutional and 
enjoining its enforcement. Because the government defendants remained parties in 
the proceedings before the district court,96 no question arose (at least under Ninth 
Circuit law) of the intervenors’ standing to participate at that level.97 
                                                                                                                 
 
 90. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010), stay 
granted, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010). 
 91. Id. at 927. 
 92. Olson and Boies famously opposed each other in the Supreme Court case involving 
the disputed 2000 election between George W. Bush and Al Gore. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 
98, 99 (2000). President Bush subsequently appointed Olson as Solicitor General of the 
United States. Tony Mauro, Olson Trying on His Morning Coat: After Senate Fight, New 
Solicitor General Narrowly Confirmed After Surprise Vote, LEGAL TIMES, May 28, 2001, at 
18. 
 93. Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 928. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 927.  
 96. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry II), 628 F.3d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 2011) (order 
certifying a question to the Supreme Court of California), certified question answered, Perry 
v. Brown, __ P.3d __, 52 Cal. 4th 1116, No. S189476, 2011 WL 5578873 (Cal. Nov. 17, 
2011).  
 97. Indeed, once the plaintiffs had sued, other plaintiffs without standing could have 
joined them; if one party satisfies Article III’s standing requirement, courts need not inquire 
into the standing of other parties who seek the same relief. E.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 
U.S. 93, 233 (2003) (“It is clear . . . that the Federal Election Commission . . . has standing, 
and therefore we need not address the standing of the intervenor-defendants, whose position 
here is identical to the FEC’s.” (citing Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 431–32, 
n.19 (1998); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986))), overruled on other grounds by 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497, 518 (2007); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 
(2006). 
  The circuits are split, however, on whether Rule 24 limits intervention solely to 
those parties with Article III standing. See Joan Steinman, Irregulars: The Appellate Rights 
of Persons Who Are Not Full-Fledged Parties, 39 GA. L. REV. 411, 426–39 (2005) 
(summarizing circuit split regarding Rule 24 intervention and Article III standing, and 
arguing that the Supreme Court’s position in cases like Bowsher suggests there is no strong 
requirement that Rule 24 intervenors have Article III standing). 
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But after the district court entered judgment, the government defendants refused 
to appeal the district court’s decision.98 The Proponents sought to appeal, but with 
the government parties now gone, the Proponents’ standing was problematic under 
the logic of the Supreme Court’s Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona.99 As 
both the district court and the Ninth Circuit noted,100 the case suggests (but does not 
actually hold) that proponents of a ballot initiative do not, by virtue of being 
proponents, satisfy Article III standards for defending that initiative.101 What 
grievance do the Prop 8 Proponents suffer? They are not themselves bound by the 
district court’s injunction—it prevents California state and local officials from 
denying marriage to gay couples but binds no private actors—and California law 
does not clearly make them appropriate parties to represent the State of California 
in federal court.102 The outrage they feel about gay marriage is the kind of emotion 
the Court has long said is not sufficient to support standing in the federal courts—a 
“generalized grievance” that the law is not as it should be or is not being enforced 
as it should be,103 without a more concrete injury. Thus they may not have the stake 
required by Article III.104 
The Ninth Circuit heard oral argument on both the standing issue and the merits 
and subsequently certified to the California Supreme Court the following question:  
Whether under Article II, Section 8 of the California Constitution, or 
otherwise under California law, the official proponents of an initiative 
measure possess either a particularized interest in the initiative’s 
validity or the authority to assert the State’s interest in the initiative's 
validity, which would enable them to defend the constitutionality of the 
initiative upon its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. Perry II, 628 F.3d at 1195. 
 99. 520 U.S. 43, 66 (1997). 
 100. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 
2010) (order granting motion to stay) (citing Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 66); Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1135–39 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (order denying motion to 
stay) (citing Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 66). 
 101. Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 66. 
 102. Id. The standing issue here overlaps with more prudential and procedural issues that 
arise on appellate review. See, e.g., 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & 
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3902, at 73 (2d ed. 1991 & 
Supp. 2011) (noting, for example, that parties may settle a lawsuit, thus making it impossible 
for an appeal to be had by non-parties). 
 103. The Court generally “has refrained from adjudicating ‘abstract questions of wide 
public significance’ which amount to ‘generalized grievances,’ pervasively shared and most 
appropriately addressed in the representative branches.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. 
United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (quoting Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975)); see also Brown, supra note 34, at 265–66.  
 104. See Steinman, supra note 97, at 419–21; Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim 
Corner: Standing to Appeal and the Right to Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 
GA. L. REV. 813, 880 (2004). 
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initiative, when the public officials charged with that duty refuse to do 
so.105 
The California Supreme Court accepted the certified question on February 16, 
2011,106 and heard oral arguments on September 6, 2011.107 The Court issued its 
response to the certified question remarkably quickly, finding that the Proponents 
were proper parties to defend Prop 8: “[W]hen the public officials who ordinarily 
defend a challenged measure decline to do so, [the California constitution and 
statutes] authorize the official proponents . . . to participate . . . in a judicial 
proceeding to assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s validity and to appeal a 
judgment invalidating the measure.”108 The case has now returned to the Ninth 
Circuit for decision. 
The Proponents also recently challenged the neutrality of now-retired District 
Judge Vaughn Walker.109 Judge Walker retired shortly after issuing the opinion 
ruling California’s gay-marriage ban unconstitutional110 and, soon after his 
retirement, confirmed what had been an “open secret,”111 that he is gay.112 The 
Proponents argued that Judge Walker should have recused himself from the 
gay-marriage case on the grounds that his long-term relationship with another man 
gave him a stake in the outcome for gay marriage—he, like the plaintiffs, wants to 
get married.113 They further argued that, because Judge Walker did not recuse 
himself, his opinion finding California’s gay-marriage ban unconstitutional must be 
vacated. Their argument was rejected by the district court.114 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. Perry II, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011) (order certifying a question to the 
Supreme Court of California), certified question answered, Perry v. Brown, __ P.3d __, 52 
Cal. 4th 1116, No. S189476, 2011 WL 5578873 (Cal. Nov. 17, 2011). 
 106. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. S189476 (Cal. Feb. 16, 2011) (order granting request 
for certification), available at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets. 
cfm?dist= 0&doc_id=1966489&doc_no=S189476. 
 107. Supreme Court of California, Oral Argument Calendar, San Francisco and 
Hastings College of Law Special Session, September 6 and 7, 2011, CAL. CTS., 
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/calendars/documents/SSEPA11.PDF. A vacancy on the 
California Supreme Court might have delayed the hearing, but a justice pro tempore was 
appointed. Id. 
 108.  Perry v. Brown, __ P.3d __, 52 Cal. 4th 1116, No. S189476, 2011 WL 5578873, at 
*20 (Cal. Nov. 17, 2011). 
 109. Judicial Bias Is Alleged in a Ruling on Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2011, at 
A12. 
 110. Bob Egelko, Prop 8 Judge on Ruling, Retirement, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 7, 2011, at A1. 
 111. Id.; see also John Schwartz, Conservative Jurist, with Independent Streak, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010, at A10. 
 112. Egelko, supra note 110. 
 113. Judicial Bias Is Alleged in a Ruling on Marriage, supra note 109. 
 114. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2011), certified question 
answered, Perry v. Brown, __ P.3d __, 52 Cal. 4th 1116, No. S189476, 2011 WL 5578873 
(Cal. Nov. 17, 2011). The district court judge deciding the motion noted that  
[r]equiring recusal because a court issued an injunction that could provide 
some speculative future benefit to the presiding judge solely on the basis of the 
fact that the judge belongs to the class against whom the unconstitutional law 
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Ironically, the recusal argument has given further heft to the arguments against 
the Proponents’ standing. In arguing that Judge Walker should have recused 
himself, the Proponents contended that a straight judge would have been 
“unaffected” by the ruling and thus more neutral. But, as observers were quick to 
point out, the basis for the Proponents’ standing is that straight people must be 
affected by gay marriage—and in fact are injured by it.115 Whether the recusal 
motion ultimately hurts the Proponents’ standing arguments before the Ninth Circuit 
remains to be seen. 
2. The Federal Defense of Marriage Act 
Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) on September 21, 
1996, providing that  
 [i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any 
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative 
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means 
only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and 
wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex 
who is a husband or a wife.116 
The General Accounting Office estimated in 2004 that DOMA affects the 
implementation of 1138 federal laws.117 
                                                                                                                 
was directed would lead to a . . . standard that required recusal of minority 
judges in most, if not all, civil rights cases. Congress could not have intended 
such an unworkable recusal statute.  
Id. at *5. Moreover, “the presumption that ‘all people in same-sex relationships think alike’ 
is an unreasonable presumption, and one which has no place in legal reasoning.” Id. at *11. 
 115. Ty Bardi, Letter to the Editor, Prop 8 Backers Hurt Cause, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 28, 
2011, at A11 (“But in saying that a gay judge cannot rule impartially because he has a 
personal stake in the outcome, whereas a straight judge does not, they are admitting that 
Prop. 8 does not have any effect whatsoever on heterosexual marriage.”); Editorial, Who’s 
Fit to Judge?; Prop. 8 Backers Say Judge Walker Should Have Recused Himself Because 
He’s Gay. That’s Absurd., L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2011, at A16 (“This claim is absurd on 
many levels, especially when you remember that ProtectMarriage’s case against same-sex 
marriage is that it threatens the institution of heterosexual marriage. In fact, the group says, 
that damage gives it the legal status to challenge the initiative, because any married 
heterosexual is allegedly harmed by same-sex unions. But if that’s the case, then by the 
group’s own logic, married heterosexual judges would also be forced to recuse themselves; 
the integrity of their own marriages could be damaged by the matter before them.”); Howard 
Wasserman, Picking Your Spots and Arguments, PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 26, 2011, 3:30 PM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/04/index.html. 
 116. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199 § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (2006) 
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)).  
 117. Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, GAO, to Bill Frist, Majority 
Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 23, 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d04353r.pdf. Note that shortly after this letter, the General Accounting Office became the 
Government Accountability Office. GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-271, § 8, 118 Stat. 811 (2004). 
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Several challenges to DOMA have been made,118 and several recent cases have 
found that the statute violates the rights of gay plaintiffs.119 The Obama 
Administration announced on February 23, 2011 that it would no longer defend 
DOMA in the courts.120 Attorney General Eric Holder announced that 
classifications based on sexual preference should be subjected to heightened 
scrutiny and that, under such scrutiny, DOMA could not survive; the United States, 
as a consequence, would no longer defend the law in court.121 
The standing issue arises, again, not because of who challenges the law: the gay 
plaintiffs argue that DOMA denies them spousal benefits including retirement 
income, health benefits, and tax benefits—economic harms directly traceable to 
DOMA that are more than sufficient to support standing. Instead, the standing 
question arises because of who wishes to defend the law, now that the Justice 
Department has refused.  
House Republicans had ordered the General Counsel of the House to defend the 
law,122 but Speaker of the House John Boehner then hired former Solicitor General 
Paul Clement to defend DOMA.123 It is unclear whether the House has standing,124 
though it appears that the United States will remain a party to the cases so that 
standing problems do not prevent the federal courts from reaching the merits of 
DOMA’s constitutionality.125 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. See, e.g., Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006); Wilson v. Ake, 
354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 
2004); Mueller v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2001-274 (2001), aff’d, 39 F. App’x 437 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
 119. In re Golinski, 587 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2009); In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 
2009); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010); Massachusetts v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010); In re Balas, 
449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011); see also Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of Treas., 764 F. 
Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (rejecting motion to dismiss gay plaintiff’s complaint on 
grounds of failure to state a claim). 
 120. Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Turnabout, U.S. Says Marriage Act 
Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at A1. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Carolyn Lochhead, House GOP Leaders Vote to Defend ’96 Marriage Act, S.F. 
CHRON., Mar. 10, 2011, at A6. 
 123. In a widely publicized scandal, Clement left his law firm, King & Spalding, after the 
firm backed out of the DOMA case under a barrage of criticism; Clement took the case to the 
firm Bancroft P.L.L.C. Michael D. Shear & John Schwartz, Law Firm Won’t Defend 
Marriage Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2011, at A1. 
 124. Chris Geidner, The Right Man: Conservative Attorney Ted Olson Has Become One 
of the Nation’s Most Powerful Voices for Marriage Equality, METRO WKLY., Mar. 10, 2011, 
at 6 (“It’ll be interesting to see whether [the House has] legal standing to do it. That’s a[] 
tough question.” (quoting former Solicitor General Theodore Olson)). In general, individual 
legislators have great difficulty showing standing to sue, see Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 
829–30 (1997), but the two houses of Congress may not face the same obstacles, see R. 
Lawrence Dessem, Congressional Standing to Sue: Whose Vote Is This, Anyway?, 62 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1 (1986). 
 125. Geidner, supra note 124, at 6; see also supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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3. What Do These Cases Tell Us About Standing? 
The standing issue in the gay-marriage case has received a great deal of media 
attention.126 Pro-gay-marriage commentators have urged the Ninth Circuit to hear 
the merits of the appeal, rather than have it dismissed for lack of standing.127 
What can we learn from the Proponents’ standing problems? It must be 
emphasized that this case raises the standing issue in an unusual posture. Standing 
doctrine usually focuses on the plaintiff. The standing of defendants is typically not 
analyzed, presumably because, assuming that the plaintiff has standing, the 
defendant risks an adverse judgment and thus has the requisite stake in the litigation 
that justifies the court’s jurisdiction.128 And a defendant who wishes to appeal an 
adverse judgment usually has standing to do so: in general, only losing parties may 
appeal, and therefore the adverse judgment satisfies any requirement of 
concreteness.129 But here, the plaintiff won, and the defendants who are bound by 
the judgment have chosen not to appeal. The Proponents, who do wish to appeal, 
are not bound by the judgment, and their interest in defending the gay-marriage ban 
is more akin to a generalized grievance than a concrete interest.130 
Yet if the Proponents cannot appeal, California’s initiative process, through 
which the people can directly amend the California Constitution when the 
government refuses to act,131 is arguably stymied by that same government’s refusal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 126. One would expect a great deal of coverage in California, and articles have appeared 
in all major California newspapers. See Westlaw Search of USNP Database, Mar. 15, 2011, 
search of (“Prop 8” & standing) (retrieving Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, 
Oakland Tribune, Sacramento Bee, San Jose Mercury News, Orange County Register, 
Stockton Record, and Fresno Bee articles). But the case has also received national attention. 
See id. (retrieving pieces in, for example, the New York Times, Boston Globe, Washington 
Post, Chicago Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, Orlando Sentinel, and Charlotte 
Observer).  
 127. Editorial, Let Appeal of Proposition 8 Proceed, ALAMEDA TIMES-STAR, Aug. 16, 
2010, available at 2010 WLNR 16672278 (“While we strongly support same-sex marriage 
and editorialized against Prop. 8, we believe that such a significant step [as finding the 
gay-marriage ban unconstitutional] would best be solidified by winning support in the 9th 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and eventually in the U.S. Supreme Court.”). 
 128. See 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 102, at 61. The ban on collusive lawsuits takes 
the defendant’s standing (or lack thereof) into account to some extent. See Muskrat v. United 
States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). 
 129. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618 (1989). The general rule prohibiting 
appeal by winning parties may be rooted to some extent in a standing concept—“what’s it to 
you?” is a resonant question when a party who has already won the judgment nevertheless 
seeks to appeal because she is irked by how she won. The rule is, however, merely 
prudential, and may be set aside if the circumstances demand it. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 
S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (holding that a state employee could appeal ruling involving the 
definition of constitutional violations, even though the employee had obtained qualified 
immunity from the lawsuit, because he nevertheless would have to change his behavior to 
reflect the ruling and thus had Article III standing to appeal). 
 130. See supra notes 34 and 66 and accompanying text. 
 131. See generally Stephen M. Griffin, California Constitutionalism: Trust in 
Government and Direct Democracy, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 551 (2009). 
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to defend the initiative.132 To permit ballot initiatives to change the law by direct 
democratic vote, but to have no mechanism by which those initiatives can be 
defended in court, makes hollow the promise of direct democracy.  
To be sure, the government might refuse to appeal a decision striking down such 
a democratically imposed law because government actors believe in good faith that 
no colorable defense can be made of the law,133 and that is almost certainly what 
happened here. But the government could equally well decline to defend such a law 
simply because it is unpopular, or expensive, or irritating. Without judicial review, 
there is no way to determine whether the democratic will is being improperly 
thwarted or properly reined in. The California Supreme Court said as much in 
answering the certified question, holding that the Proponents were proper parties to 
appeal the district court’s decision:  
[I]n instances in which the challenged law has been adopted through the 
initiative process there is a realistic risk that the public officials may not 
defend the approved initiative measure “with vigor.” This enhanced risk 
is attributable to the unique nature and purpose of the initiative power, 
which gives the people the right to adopt into law measures that their 
elected officials have not adopted and may often oppose.134  
But how can California state law confer federal standing on the Proponents? The 
Court has placed clear limits on the power of Congress to legislate standing. In 
1975, the Court stated that “[t]he actual or threatened injury required by Art. III 
may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which 
creates standing.’”135 But by 1992 it had made clear that “‘[i]ndividual 
rights’ . . . do not mean public rights that have been legislatively pronounced to 
belong to each individual who forms part of the public. . . . [Our prior cases] 
involved Congress’ elevating to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, 
de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.”136 Or, put more plainly, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 132. The Ninth Circuit seems likely to affirm the district court’s opinion: the proponents 
put on almost no factual case, see Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 930–32 (N.D. Cal. 2010), 
and Judge Walker’s decision invalidating the gay-marriage ban is exhaustive, well-reasoned, 
and sound. 
 133. The federal Department of Justice has reached a similar conclusion about the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act. See supra notes 120–21and accompanying text. 
 134.  Perry v. Brown, __ P.3d __, 52 Cal. 4th 1116, No. S189476, 2011 WL 5578873, at 
*17 (Cal. Nov. 17, 2011) (citation omitted). 
 135. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 
U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973)) (emphasis added). 
 136. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). To be sure, Justice Kennedy, in his Lujan concurrence, stated that 
“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give 
rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.” Id. at 579–80 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1153 (2009) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 126 n.22 (1997) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). But the Lujan majority states: 
Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of Congress, in 
ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases, they would be 
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“[i]t is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by 
statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have 
standing.”137 How, then, could a California state law confer standing where 
Congress could not?138 
One might respond that all this highlights how needlessly complicated our 
standing doctrine has become. After all, the older Baker v. Carr requirement for 
standing is more than satisfied here: “the appellants allege[] such a personal stake in 
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which 
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for 
illumination of difficult constitutional questions[.]”139 And it seems odd to say that 
one federal district judge has the final say because California officials have declined 
to appeal, when what is at stake is a proposition (however misguided) chosen by the 
majority of California voters at the ballot box. Admittedly, many lawsuits end at the 
district court level for one reason or another;140 as I discuss below, however,141 
having a case involving such controversial issues end at the district court because of 
                                                                                                                 
discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional 
role of the Third Branch—one of the essential elements that identifies those 
“Cases” and “Controversies” that are the business of the courts rather than of 
the political branches. 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added). 
 137. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997) (citation omitted); see also Summers, 
129 S. Ct. at 1151 (“[T]he requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III 
jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.”). 
 138. The question has been little addressed. See 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.14, at 280 (3d 
ed. 2008). 
 139. 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 
(2007) (quoting same language from Baker); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 583 (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (same); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 
(1978) (same). Indeed, in holding that the Proponents were proper parties under California 
law to appeal the adverse judgment, the California Supreme Court highlighted the benefits to 
judicial decision making of the Proponents’ participation: 
 
The experience of California courts in reviewing challenges to voter-approved 
initiative measures over many years thus teaches that permitting the official 
proponents of an initiative to participate as parties in postelection cases, even 
when public officials are also defending the initiative measure, often is essential 
to ensure that the interests and perspective of the voters who approved the 
measure are not consciously or unconsciously subordinated to other public 
interests that may be championed by elected officials, and that all viable legal 
arguments in favor of the initiative’s validity are brought to the court’s 
attention. 
 
Perry v. Brown, __ P.3d __, 52 Cal. 4th 1116, No. S189476, 2011 WL 5578873, at *19 (Cal. 
Nov. 17, 2011). 
 140. Cases may settle; a losing defendant may decide that appeal is not worth the money; 
a “losing” defendant may like the reasoning behind the plaintiff’s “win” and decide not to 
appeal, while the “winning” plaintiff is forbidden to appeal, however unhappy she is with the 
result. 
 141. See infra Part IV.C. 
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the confusing ins-and-outs of standing doctrine is undesirable and highlights the 
case for a prudential, rather than an Article III approach to standing. 
More abstractly, the Proponents may simply be victims of the usual asymmetry 
in standing doctrine: those burdened by a law have standing to challenge it; those 
who benefit from the law’s enforcement must meet more specific standing 
criteria.142 So one might analogize the Proponents’ efforts to defend the California 
gay-marriage ban against the gay plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and Due Process 
challenges to the efforts of, for example, the San Francisco Baykeeper to defend 
section 404 of the Clean Water Act against a business’s Commerce Clause 
challenges.143 Those regulated by the law—gay couples burdened by the ban on gay 
marriage or businesses burdened by wetlands regulation—clearly have standing to 
sue.144 Those benefitting from the law—the Proponents from the prevention of gay 
marriage and Baykeeper members from the regulation of wetlands—have a more 
difficult time showing standing.145 
But surely the kinds of benefit at stake in the two cases are different. Assume the 
federal court determines that section 404 is unconstitutional as applied to that 
wetland, thus precluding its application to prevent the dredging and filling of the 
wetland. If I am a person who uses the wetland for recreation (say, bird-watching), 
and the wetland will disappear because section 404 does not protect it, I will no 
longer be able to bird-watch there. The Court has long recognized such 
consequences as injury in fact for standing.146 
But it is hard to identify any kind of similar harm for the Proponents. Indeed, the 
Proponents here look much like the plaintiff physician in Diamond v. Charles, who 
sought to defend the constitutionality of an anti-abortion law.147 The physician 
lacked standing for a variety of reasons, which boiled down to his objections to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. See supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
 143. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act delegates to the Army Corps of Engineers and 
the Environmental Protection Agency the authority to protect America’s wetlands from 
filling (as when a developer wishes to fill a marshy area in order to build houses across an 
expanse of land). Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). The Corps has interpreted the 
statute to require permits for even isolated and transitory wetlands, and that interpretation 
has been challenged repeatedly as inconsistent with Congress’s intent in the statute or (if 
consistent with Congress’s intent) unconstitutional as beyond the scope of the Commerce 
Clause. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (deciding scope of 
section 404 on statutory grounds but noting constitutional question); Solid Waste Agency of 
N. Cook Cnty. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001) (same). 
 144. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 159 (not even hinting that standing was any 
question in suit by regulated entities against Corps); Lujan 504 U.S. at 561 (“[When] the 
plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. . . . there is ordinarily 
little question that [he has standing].”). 
 145. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562; see also, e.g., Save Ourselves, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, 958 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding standing lacking for environmental 
group opposing Corps’s actions regarding wetlands).  
 146. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 
191 (2000); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 744–46 (1972). 
 147. 476 U.S. 54 (1986). 
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abortion and his strong feelings that abortion should be illegal.148 The Court said, 
“Article III requires more than a desire to vindicate value interests.”149 
As Professor Karlan has recently written, however, the conservative members of 
the Court may well think that the Proponents have standing. In analyzing an earlier 
case arising from the Prop 8 litigation, which involved whether the district court 
proceedings could be televised, the Court “articulate[d] the view that supporters of 
traditional marriage are at substantial risk of unfair treatment and therefore 
deserving of special judicial solicitude.”150 Karlan notes that other recent cases 
reflect similar fears that traditional beliefs are being marginalized.151 
B. Health Care 
1. Challenges to Recent Health Care Legislation 
President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA)152 into law on March 23, 2010.153 Pejoratively called “ObamaCare,”154 
PPACA (inter alia) protects those with pre-existing conditions,155 creates state-level 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. See id. at 62–67. 
 149. Id. at 66; see also Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 
1998) (citation omitted) (“A purely ideological interest is not an adequate basis for standing 
to sue in a federal court.”).  
 150. Karlan, supra note 84, at 181. 
 151. Id. (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)) (applying First 
Amendment to protect corporate political campaign expenditures); Citizens United, 130 S. 
Ct. at 980–81 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing harassment of conservative initiative 
proponents as the reason Court’s decision should have gone further); Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 
2811 (2011) (rejecting a challenge to public records act by conservatives seeking to keep 
private their signatures on an anti-domestic-partnership referendum petition); Reed, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2823 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The widespread harassment and 
intimidation suffered by supporters of California’s Proposition 8 provides strong support for 
an as-applied exemption in the present case.”); Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 
2971 (2010) (upholding a public law school’s ban on funds for a student group that required 
members to affirm that only marriage between a man and a woman provided a permissible 
context for sex); id. at 3000, 3010, 3019–20 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The proudest boast of 
our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we 
hate.’ Today’s decision rests on a very different principle: no freedom for expression that 
offends prevailing standards of political correctness in our country’s institutions of higher 
learning.” (citation omitted)). 
 152. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
 153. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, A Stroke of a Pen, Make That 20, and It’s 
Official, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A19. 
 154. Andrew Gelman, Nate Silver & Daniel Lee, The Senate’s Health Care Calculations, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, at A35 (“Critics of the health care reform plan often refer to it 
derisively as ‘Obamacare.’”). 
 155. § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154 (amending Public Health Service Act § 2704, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300gg (2006)). 
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health insurance exchanges,156 and (starting in 2014) imposes fines on individuals 
who have not purchased health insurance policies (the “individual mandate”).157 
Within minutes after the President signed the bill into law, opponents began 
filing lawsuits arguing that PPACA—in particular, its individual mandate—should 
be declared unconstitutional.158 Dozens of lawsuits have been filed challenging the 
law,159 and Article III standing has been an issue in almost all of them. Several 
federal circuits have heard appeals from these cases; some found standing and 
addressed the constitutionality of PPACA,160 some found that the state plaintiff 
                                                                                                                 
 
 156. Id. §§ 1311–13, 1321–24. 
 157. Id. § 1501. 
 158. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 
1256, 1263 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (order granting summary judgment) (“This case, challenging 
the Constitutionality of [PPACA], was filed minutes after the President signed.”), aff’d in 
part & rev’d in part, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th 
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011). 
 159. See id.; Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039 (6th 
Cir. June 29, 2011); Kinder v. Geithner, No. 1:10-cv-101 RWS, 2011 WL 1576721 (E.D. 
Mo. Apr. 26, 2011); Peterson v. United States, 774 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.N.H. 2011); Mead v. 
Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2011); Bryant v. Holder, No. 10-CV-76-KS-MTP, 2011 
WL 710693 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3, 2011); U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Obama, 754 F. Supp. 2d 903 
(N.D. Ohio 2010); Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 764 F. Supp. 
2d 684 (M.D. Penn. 2011), subsequent opinion at No. 1:10-CV-763, 2011 WL 4072875 
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. 
Va. 2010), vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (2011); N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, 757 F. Supp. 2d 
502 (D.N.J. 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2011); Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 753 F. 
Supp. 2d 611, (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated, No. 10–2347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 
2011); Shreeve v. Obama, No. 1:10-CV-71, 2010 WL 4628177 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2010); 
Anderson v. Obama, No. Civ. PJM 10-17, 2010 WL 3000765 (D. Md. July 28, 2010); 
Baldwin v. Sebelius, No. 10CV01033 DMS (WMC), 2010 WL 3418436 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 
2010), aff’d, 654 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 573 (2010); see also 
Independent Am. Party of Nev. v. Obama, No. 2:10-cv-1477 JCM (GWF) (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 
2011); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. 6:11-cv-
00030-RAW (E.D. Okla. Jan. 1, 2011); Complaint, Purpura v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-04814-
FLW-DEA (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2010); Complaint, Calvey v. Obama, No. 5:10-cv-00353-R 
(W.D. Okla. Aug. 6, 2010); Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, 
Sissel v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10-cv-01263-RJL (D.D.C. July 26, 
2010); Complaint, Fountain Hills Tea Party Patriots, L.L.C. v. Sebelius, No. 2:10-cv-00893-
DKD (D. Ariz. Apr. 22, 2010); Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary Injunctive 
Relief, Peterson v. Obama, No. 1:10-cv-00170-JL (D.N.H. May 4, 2010); Complaint, Van 
Tassel v. United States, No. 1:10-cv-00310-TDS-PTS (M.D.N.C. Apr. 22, 2010); Class 
Action Petition for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Burlsworth v. Holder, No. 4:10-cv-
00258-SWW (E.D. Ark. Apr. 27, 2010); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 
Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:10-cv-00499-RJL (D.D.C. 
Mar. 26, 2010); Complaint, Bellow v. Sebelius, No. 1:10-cv-00165-RC-KFG (E.D. Tex. 
Mar. 24, 2010); NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, HEALTH REFORM LITIGATION CASE 
SCHEDULING (Feb. 22, 2011) (citing Complaint, Coons v. Geithner, No. 2:10-cv-01714-
GMS (D. Ariz. Aug. 12, 2010)). 
 160. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 536 (6th Cir. 2011), petition for 
cert. filed, No. 11-117 (U.S. July 26, 2011) (holding that plaintiffs had standing because “the 
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lacked standing to sue,161 and one found the challenge violative of the Anti-
Injunction Act.162 
The cases involve several categories of plaintiffs, and hence a number of 
different arguments about standing: 
• Individuals who contend that the individual-insurance mandate 
injures them (1) by exposing them to threat of penalty in 2014 if 
they do not have health insurance then, and/or (2) by forcing them 
to make financial adjustments now in preparation for the 
imposition of the mandate in 2014. In cases where the plaintiff 
alleged only the former injury, the courts have typically held that 
it was an insufficient injury for Article III purposes.163 In cases 
                                                                                                                 
impending requirement to buy medical insurance on the private market has changed their 
present spending and saving habits”; going on to hold, on the merits, that the individual 
mandate was constitutional); Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 
1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (noting that the 
government defendants had conceded the standing of one plaintiff and thus had made it 
unnecessary for the court to decide whether other plaintiffs had standing, given that “the law 
is abundantly clear that so long as at least one plaintiff has standing to raise each claim . . . 
we need not address whether the remaining plantiffs have standing”; holding, on the merits, 
that parts of PPACA are unconstitutional (citations omitted)). Cf. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, No. 11-679 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2011) (holding—
in an opinion written by Judge Silberman, a Republican appointee—that PPACA’s 
individual mandate is constitutional but providing no Article III standing discussion). 
 161. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 269 (4th Cir. 2011), petition 
for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420) (holding that Virginia 
statute purporting to immunize Virginia citizens from PPACA did not create an injury in fact 
for Virginia to sue regarding the enforceability of its own laws: “[T]he Constitution itself 
withholds from Virginia the power to enforce the VHCFA against the federal 
government. . . . This non-binding declaration does not create any genuine conflict with the 
individual mandate, and thus creates no sovereign interest capable of producing 
injury-in-fact.” (citation omitted)); New Jersey Physicians, Inc. v. President of the United 
States, 653 F.3d 234, 239–41 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding plaintiffs’ complaint barren of 
allegations that would support standing). 
 162. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10–2347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 
2011), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3240 (Oct. 7, 2011) (No. 11-438) (holding that 
the plaintiffs’ challenge to the individual mandate amounted to a pre-enforcement challenge 
to a tax, something prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act, IRC § 7421(a)). 
 163. See Kinder, 2011 WL 1576721, at *5 (noting that plaintiff’s term in office expires in 
2013, and so his asserted injury—that he would face worse health care choices both as a 
Missouri employee and as one who hires—was speculative); Bryant, 2011 WL 710693, at 
*10–11 (rejecting uncertainty regarding “what might conceivably occur” as a reason to deny 
standing, but nevertheless finding standing lacking because the plaintiffs had not alleged 
enough to show an injury); Peterson, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 423–25 (finding plaintiff lacked 
standing because he qualified for Medicare and thus could not be subjected to penalties 
under PPACA’s insurance mandate); Baldwin, 2010 WL 3418436, at *3 (noting that 
plaintiff Baldwin had failed to allege whether or not he had health insurance and that, 
regardless, he might take any number of actions that will provide him with insurance before 
the individual mandate becomes effective in 2014); New Jersey Physicians, Inc., 757 F. 
Supp. 2d at 506–07 (also denying standing to a doctor because he alleged no concrete harm 
flowing from PPACA). 
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where plaintiffs alleged the latter or both forms of injury, courts 
have ruled that the latter or both were sufficient.164 
• Employers (including governmental entities such as states) who 
do not want to be subject to the employer provisions. Again, some 
courts have held this injury sufficient,165 others insufficient.166 
• States qua states. A lower court held that the Commonwealth of 
Virginia had standing solely as a sovereign entity,167 an argument 
that the Fourth Circuit rejected on appeal,168 and arguments to the 
same effect have been made in the appeal of the Florida case,169 
though those arguments were found irrelevant on appeal.170 
                                                                                                                 
 
 164. See Thomas More Ctr., 2011 WL 2556039, at *3–5 (in the first appellate decision to 
issue on the merits of PPACA, finding not only that certain plaintiffs had already altered 
their behavior because of the statute but also that the challenge was ripe regardless: “In view 
of the probability, indeed virtual certainty, that the minimum coverage provision will apply 
to the plaintiffs on January 1, 2014, no function of standing law is advanced by requiring 
plaintiffs to wait until six months or one year before the effective date to file this lawsuit.”); 
Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 23–27 (finding standing because the present financial injury to 
plaintiff was sufficient; also finding the prospective injury sufficient, even though the 
plaintiff might not be harmed by the mandate, because uncertainty is inevitable in 
pre-enforcement review of a statute); Goudy-Bachman, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 690–92 (same); 
Liberty Univ., 753 F. Supp. 2d at 624–26 (same); U.S. Citizens Ass’n, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 
907–08 (same);Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 888 (E.D. Mich. 
2010) (same); Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. 
Supp. 2d 1120, 1144–48 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2010) (order and memorandum opinion on 
motion to dismiss) (same). 
 165. See Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1271–73 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (State 
of Florida had standing as an employer because it would have to either expend funds to 
satisfy PPACA’s mandate or expend funds on penalties under PPACA); Liberty Univ., 753 
F. Supp. 2d at 622–26 (holding that plaintiff Liberty University had standing because its 
health care plan would be deemed insufficient and it would have to spend more on providing 
health insurance under PPACA). 
 166. See Baldwin, 2010 WL 3418436, at *3 (holding that plaintiff Pacific Justice 
Institute lacked standing because it made no allegations that it was a large enough 
organization to be subject to PPACA’s employer provisions and that, in any event, it already 
provided health insurance to its employees that may satisfy PPACA’s requirements). 
 167. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 603, 607 (“In the immediate case, 
the Commonwealth is exercising a core sovereign power because the effect of the federal 
enactment is to require Virginia to yield under the Supremacy Clause. . . . Federal regulatory 
action that preempts state law creates a sufficient injury-in-fact.” (citation omitted)).  
 168. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 269 (4th Cir. 2011), 
petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420). 
 169. See Brief for Appellants, Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-11021); Opening / Response Brief of 
Appellee / Cross-Appellant States, Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-11021); Reply Brief of Appellee 
Cross-Appellant States, Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 
F. Supp. 2d 1120 (11th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067). The 11th Circuit heard oral 
arguments on June 8, 2011.  
 170. See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th 
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011). 
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• People who are angry about PPACA because they think it is 
unconstitutional. Courts have consistently ruled that these 
plaintiffs lack standing.171 
2. What Do These Cases Tell Us About Standing? 
Most of these cases should not surprise those who follow debates about standing; 
the courts in most of the cases applied fairly ordinary analyses to find that plaintiffs 
did or did not have standing. Indeed, the Court has very recently granted certiorari 
in the one case where standing was conceded.172 
Like many famous standing cases, the problems faced by many of the plaintiffs 
here derive from their failure to plead the right facts.173 Just as Amy Skilbred was 
found to lack standing in Lujan because she failed to allege concrete plans to travel 
to see the endangered tigers she sued to protect,174 here many individual plaintiffs 
lacked standing because they failed to allege sufficient present-day harm; the 
plaintiffs who alleged “I have to change my behavior now to prepare for this law’s 
effects” were found to have standing, for the most part, while those plaintiffs who 
alleged “I don’t want to have to pay a penalty in 2014” with nothing more were 
found to lack standing.175 
Similarly, those who sued because they were angry about PPACA, with nothing 
more, lacked standing under straightforward application of standing doctrine. As 
discussed above,176 generalized grievances about the content of the law, or about 
failure to enforce the law, have long been found insufficient to meet the 
requirements of Article III. Indeed, decades before the current edifice of standing 
had been erected, the Court was rejecting generalized grievances.177 
Most interesting is the state qua state standing issue. States are seizing on 
Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the Supreme Court recognized Massachusetts’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 171. Baldwin, 2010 WL 3418436, at *3 (to the extent they say they are injured simply by 
the fact of PPACA’s alleged unconstitutionality, “Plaintiffs are simply airing generalized 
grievances that the Court is precluded from adjudicating” (citation omitted)); Shreeve, 2010 
WL 4628177, at *4 (same). 
 172. Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 
2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (noting that the government defendants had 
conceded the standing of one plaintiff and thus had made it unnecessary for the court to 
decide whether other plaintiffs had standing, given that “the law is abundantly clear that so 
long as at least one plaintiff has standing to raise each claim . . . we need not address 
whether the remaining plaintiffs have standing”). 
 173. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 26, at 5–6 (“Put bluntly, the ‘individualized injury’ 
determination often depends on using certain magic words. Such arbitrariness also 
characterizes the other two Article III standards. First, ‘causation’ is a discretionary policy 
judgment about how far back in a related chain of events a court is willing to go. Second, 
ascertaining whether the requested relief will ‘likely’ redress the injury involves guesswork 
about probabilities.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 174. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563–64 (1992). 
 175. See supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 177. E.g., Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129–30 (1922). 
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standing to sue to force the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases.178 The standing 
analysis in that case emphasized the quasi-sovereign status of Massachusetts as key 
to the standing inquiry.179 The Court, as Justice Stevens wrote for the majority, had 
long “recognized that States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking 
federal jurisdiction.”180 Oddly, the Commonwealth’s sovereign status played no 
clear role in the subsequent standing analysis.181 But states are using the 
Massachusetts v. EPA language regarding state sovereignty to support Article III 
standing in these health care cases182 and in other efforts.183 Indeed, one state has 
filed the anti-Massachusetts case: Texas has sued to stop greenhouse gas 
regulation.184 
The argument for state standing in the health care cases is problematic, however. 
In Massachusetts v. EPA, despite ample handwaving about state sovereignty, the 
state’s standing was ultimately predicated on harm to state property itself.185 In 
Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services and Virginia ex rel. 
Cuccinelli, the states claimed injury based on the conflict between their state laws 
and an allegedly unconstitutional federal law. But, as amici in both cases have 
pointed out, this argument overreaches. To explain why requires a little 
background.186 
States can sue to protect their citizens in parens patriae (as the protective 
parent).187 The concept originally applied to justify the state’s action to protect 
                                                                                                                 
 
 178. See 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 179. Id. at 518. 
 180. Id. (citing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)). 
 181. See id. at 522–23 (focusing on Massachusetts’s loss of shoreline thanks to rising sea 
levels, which is a straightforward injury in fact that could happen to any riparian landowner, 
state, or individual); see also id. at 540 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“It is not at all clear how 
the Court’s ‘special solicitude’ for Massachusetts plays out in the standing analysis, except 
as an implicit concession that petitioners cannot establish standing on traditional terms.”). 
 182. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 603, 606–07. 
 183. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 
245 (D. Mass. 2010) (finding standing for Massachusetts to challenge the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act because “[t]he Commonwealth has amassed approximately $640,661 in 
additional tax liability and forsaken at least $2,224,018 in federal funding because DOMA 
bars HHS’s Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services from using federal funds to insure 
same-sex married couples”). 
 184. See Texas’ Bid to Stop EPA Plan Reaches Washington Court, FORT WORTH 
STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec. 31, 2010, 2010 WLNR 25652781 (“Once again the federal 
government is overreaching and improperly intruding upon the state of Texas and its legal 
rights.” (quoting Tex. Att’y Gen. Greg Abbott)). 
 185. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 526. 
 186. See, e.g., Brief of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Defendants-Appellants at 3–4, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-
11021 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 2011). For an excellent and thorough discussion of the standing of 
states, see Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 54 (concluding, after a thorough review of the 
history of state standing—strictly limited in the nineteenth century and incoherently 
expanded in the twentieth—that state standing should be limited, in part to “reinforce the 
principle that constitutional rights are held by people, not government”). 
 187. “‘This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, 
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those who could not help themselves—children and incompetents—but expanded to 
justify the state’s action to protect all its citizens in certain circumstances.188 So, for 
example, the Supreme Court has recognized the standing of a state to sue another 
state over natural gas policy189 and of a state to sue companies for antitrust 
violations190 and violations of civil rights laws.191 
But it has long been settled that states may not sue the federal government in 
parens patriae: 
It cannot be conceded that a State, as parens patriae, may institute 
judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United States from the 
operation of the statutes thereof. While the State, under some 
circumstances, may sue in that capacity for the protection of its citizens, 
it is no part of its duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their 
relations with the Federal Government. In that field it is the United 
States, and not the State, which represents them as parens patriae, when 
such representation becomes appropriate . . . .192 
On this logic, the federal courts have declined to hear cases brought by states 
challenging federal laws regarding maternal and infant mortality,193 
transportation,194 taxes,195 water pollution,196 air pollution,197 and the decision about 
where to locate the national high-level nuclear waste repository.198 This limitation 
derives, the Court has said, from the fundamental purpose of the Constitution: to 
protect individual rights. “The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of 
States for the benefit of the States . . . [but] for the protection of individuals.”199 
Thus, Florida and Virginia would not have standing to sue simply because they 
allege that their citizens are suffering under the operation of an allegedly 
unconstitutional federal law, the PPACA. To be able to sue the federal government, 
a state must show that it (and not its citizens) has suffered injury. That injury can 
                                                                                                                 
whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature [and] is a most beneficent 
function . . . often necessary to be exercised in the interests of humanity, and for the 
prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.’”Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. 
Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982) (alteration in original) (omission in 
original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 
(1890)). 
 188. See id. at 600. 
 189. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 591–92 (1923). 
 190. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 45–52 (1945). 
 191. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607–10. 
 192. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
 193. See id. at 488–89. 
 194. See Texas v. Interstate Comm. Comm’n, 258 U.S. 158, 160, 165 (1922). 
 195. See Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 18 (1927); cf. New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 
328, 337–39 (1926) (rejecting New Jersey’s standing to challenge the Federal Water Power 
Act, which New Jersey argued would interfere with its own revenue-raising water projects). 
 196. See Michigan v. EPA, 581 F.3d 524, 531 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 197. See Citizens Against Ruining the Env’t v. EPA, 535 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 198. See Nevada v. Burford, 918 F.2d 854, 856–58 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 199. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992). 
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occur to the state in its proprietary capacity—as a market participant, for example—
and in its sovereign capacity—the ability to create and enforce a criminal code, for 
example. Florida and Virginia have thus passed statutes that purport to replace the 
PPACA, or to exempt their citizens from the operation of the PPACA, and they 
argue that they sue, not in parens patriae, but on their own account, to protect their 
sovereign interests in seeing these laws enforced. 
But the Court has given quite uneven treatment to standing based on a state’s 
sovereign interest in seeing its law enforced when a federal law preempts that state 
law. One might argue that the states gave up the ability to litigate such interests 
when they entered the Union; those interests are, after all, protected by the state’s 
representatives in the national legislature.200 While some cases have allowed states 
to litigate such sovereignty interests against federal officials,201 the Court has quite 
strictly parsed the state’s claims to make sure the state is not violating the Mellon 
prohibition on litigating the interests of state citizens against the federal 
government.202 
Thus, although the district court in Virginia stated that “[f]ederal regulatory 
action that preempts state law creates a sufficient injury-in-fact to satisfy” standing 
requirements (and the Florida district court wrote in substantially similar terms),203 
the Fourth Circuit disagreed: the statute that Virginia was litigating did nothing 
more than purport to protect Virginia’s citizens from the operation of federal law, 
which Virginia has no right to do.204 That the lawsuits further argue that the PPACA 
is unconstitutional does not change the analysis; it is the individuals who will be 
regulated by the allegedly unconstitutional law who have standing to challenge it, 
not the states. 
Indeed, as amici pointed out in the appeal of the Florida case, allowing state 
standing in these circumstances would vitiate Article III standing in many 
circumstances. “[I]f a putative conflict between state and federal law itself sufficed 
to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of standing analysis, there would be no way of 
ensuring that the challenged federal law actually injured an individual party; the 
existence of standing would be governed simply by the abstract—and quite possibly 
hypothetical—conflict between state and federal law.”205 
                                                                                                                 
 
 200. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (“[T]he 
principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system 
lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself.”). 
 201. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 54, at 492–94 (citing South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) and Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)). 
 202. Id. (noting certain claims that South Carolina was not permitted to pursue against 
the federal government because those claims were really held by South Carolina citizens). 
 203. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607 (E.D. Va. 2010); 
see also Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 
1256, 1272 (N.D. Fla. 2011). 
 204. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 269 (4th Cir. 2011), 
petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420). 
 205. Brief for Professors of Federal Jurisdiction as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant 
at 34, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 11-1057 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2011) (citations 
omitted); cf. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 54, at 504. 
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The Court has found a ready way to avoid creating such a problem for standing 
doctrine: it has granted certiorari in a PPACA case with no standing question. Thus, 
the health care litigation will not illuminate these interesting questions of state 
standing, at least not anytime soon. 
C. Stem Cell Research 
1. Recent Litigation over Expansion of Stem Cell Research 
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) began funding research involving human 
embryonic stem cells in 2001.206 Such cells, as their name makes clear, are derived 
from human embryos, and the destruction of those embryos for research has been a 
source of great controversy.207 NIH funding during the Bush administration was 
restricted to cell lines already in existence as of August 9, 2001; federal funds could 
not be provided for any research that involved destruction of additional embryos to 
create stem cells.208 On March 9, 2009, President Obama asked NIH to issue 
guidelines for expanded federal funding for human embryonic stem cell research.209 
Final regulations were issued a few months later, providing that individuals who 
had used in vitro fertilization (IVF) for reproductive purposes could donate excess 
embryos for use in stem cell research.210 Because an estimated 400,000 excess 
embryos exist,211 the number of stem cell research projects that could be funded by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 206. Doe v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 2011). Such research, it is argued, may 
lead to major medical and scientific breakthroughs. See Stephen R. Latham, The Once and 
Future Debate on Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 483, 484 (2009) (“Both adult and embryonic stem cells have tremendous potential 
for exploitation in the development of therapies for disease. . . . [T]hey are of great utility in 
testing and comparing cellular responses to different drugs and biological materials. 
Moreover . . . stem cells may become a source of replacement cells for people with cellular 
diseases like diabetes, Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s.”).  
 207. Dan W. Brock, Creating Embryos for Use in Stem Cell Research, 38 J. L. MED. & 
ETHICS 229, 229 (2010) (“Some commentators assign full moral status of normal adult 
human beings to the embryo from the moment of its conception. At the other extreme are 
those who believe that a human embryo has no significant moral status at the time it is used 
and destroyed in stem cell research. And in between are many intermediate positions that 
assign an embryo some degree of moral status between none and full.”). 
 208. See George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research from Crawford, 
Texas, 37 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 1149, 1150–51 (Aug. 9, 2001); see also Exec. Order 
No. 13435, 72 Fed. Reg. 34591 (June 20, 2007). 
 209. Exec. Order No. 13505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10667 (Mar. 9, 2009). 
 210. National Institutes of Health Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 32170, 32170–71 (July 7, 2009). See generally Brock, supra note 207, at 231–32 
(explaining that many find such donations for stem cell research appropriate because, 
regardless of such research, “it is typical . . . for fertility clinics to fertilize a number of eggs 
for potential use in IVF since it is unclear . . . how many will be needed [for] a successful 
pregnancy. As a result, there are many excess embryos no longer needed for further 
reproductive use . . . ; these are now typically stored in freezers in IVF clinics”); Gregory 
Dolin, A Defense of Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 84 IND. L.J. 1203 (2009). 
 211. Brock, supra note 207, at 231. 
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NIH increased dramatically. At least two lawsuits have challenged the expansion of 
NIH funding.  
In the first Sherley v. Sebelius case,212 the plaintiffs included two researchers 
who worked with adult stem cells, the Christian Medical Association, the class 
consisting of “all individual human embryos that were created for reproductive 
purposes, but are no longer needed for those purposes,” a Christian adoption agency 
specializing in the adoption of human embryos, and several couples who wished to 
adopt human embryos.213 The district court dismissed the case after finding that all 
the plaintiffs lacked standing.214 The D.C. Circuit reversed on the ground that the 
researchers had standing; as competitors for NIH grants, the researchers were 
injured because NIH’s expansion of funding eligibility to more stem cell research 
projects “increase[d] . . . competition, [and these] increases . . . will almost certainly 
cause an injury in fact.”215  
In the second case, Doe v. Obama, a suit was brought by Mary Scott Doe (an 
embryo frozen in cryopreservation), other similarly situated embryos, four couples 
who wished to adopt embryos, and the National Organization for Embryonic Law 
                                                                                                                 
 
 212. 686 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 610 F.3d 69 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 213. Id. at 3. A human embryo that is adopted is then implanted in the adoptive mother or 
a surrogate and, assuming no problems with the pregnancy, carried to term. Such adoptions 
(1) can occur because the adopting individual finds embryo adoption more affordable than 
IVF, see Alexia M. Baiman, Cryopreserved Embryos As America’s Prospective Adoptees: 
Are Couples Truly “Adopting” or Merely Transferring Property Rights?, 16 WM. & MARY 
J. WOMEN & L. 133, 134 (2009), or (2) can occur as part of a deliberate pro-life strategy 
linked to efforts to obtain legal recognition of the personhood of embryos, see Katheryn D. 
Katz, Snowflake Adoptions and Orphan Embryos: The Legal Implications of Embryo 
Donation, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 179, 180 (2003). 
 214. Sherley, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 5–7. The Christian Medical Association asserted only 
that its purpose was frustrated by NIH funding of human embryonic stem cell research; such 
frustration is only an “abstract concern.” Id. at 5 (quoting National Taxpayers Union v. 
United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). The embryos lacked standing because 
they were not persons under the law. Id. at 5–6. The adoption agency and the couples lacked 
standing because their claimed injury (a lessening in the availability of embryos for 
adoption) was too speculative—rather than being caused directly by the new NIH guidelines, 
that injury would be caused by the independent and voluntary decisions of donors, who 
“must choose between continuing to store the embryos, discarding them, donating them for 
research, or giving them to an adoption agency involved in embryonic adoption.” Id. at 5. 
And the researchers’ claim that they were injured by an increase in competition for NIH 
funding was not supported by the law of competitor standing. Id. at 6–7.  
 215. See Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69, 72–74 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The other parties 
conceded their lack of standing, id. at 71, but, once the appellate court decided that the 
researchers had standing, the other parties would have been able to participate regardless, 
see supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
  According to the Justice Department, one of the researchers in fact received NIH 
funding despite the new rules, and the other researcher had never applied for an NIH grant. 
Defendants’ Emergency Motion to Stay Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal and Request 
for Immediate Administrative Stay, Sherley v. Sebelius, No. 10-5287 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 8, 
2010), available at http://www.nih.gov/about/director/stemcell/stay_09082010.pdf; see also 
Greenhouse, supra note 16 (“To call their claim to injury-in-fact ‘speculative,’ as the 
government’s brief does, is an understatement. I would call it incredible . . . .”). 
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(NOEL).216 Applying the same reasoning used in Sherley,217 the Doe court found 
that the embryos were not legal persons,218 that NOEL was not injured by “a mere 
‘conflict between [the] defendant’s conduct and [the] organization’s mission,’”219 
and that the adoptive parents’ injury was caused, not by the government defendants, 
but by the independent choices of third parties (those individuals who could choose 
whether to donate embryos for research or for adoption, to keep them frozen, or to 
dispose of them).220 The dismissal for lack of standing was affirmed on appeal.221 
2. What Do These Cases Tell Us About Standing? 
The plaintiffs in the stem cell research cases face problems very similar to those 
faced by environmental plaintiffs in many lawsuits. Environmental plaintiffs who 
sue to protect endangered species or ecosystems are really suing about the threat to 
the endangered species or the ecosystem, but the species/ecosystem is not a legal 
person whose harm is cognizable in the federal courts. Standing thus cannot derive 
from the harm to that entity itself. Instead, the plaintiff must argue that she depends 
on the entity for her research or recreation or aesthetic enjoyment.222 
This awkward misfit between what standing requires and what the lawsuit is 
really about has led some to urge that Congress give standing to animals.223 Others 
have suggested expanding standing to environmental resources generally.224 
Suggestions of this sort date at least to the early 1970s, when Christopher Stone 
                                                                                                                 
 
 216. Doe v. Obama, 670 F. Supp. 2d 435 (D. Md. 2009). 
 217. See Sherley v. Sebelius, 686 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 218. Doe, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 440 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)). 
 219. Id. at 441 (quoting Buchanan v. Consolidated Stores Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 730, 
737–38 (D. Md. 2001)). 
 220. See id. at 441. 
 221. Doe v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 222. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563–64 (1992) (finding that plaintiffs 
lacked standing because their affidavits, while possibly supporting the conclusion “that 
certain agency-funded projects threaten[ed] listed species . . . plainly contain[ed] no 
facts . . . showing how damage to the species will produce ‘imminent’ injury to” the 
plaintiffs); see also Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 
n.4 (1986) (noting that plaintiffs “undoubtedly have alleged a sufficient ‘injury in fact’ in 
that the whale watching and studying of their members will be adversely affected by 
continued whale harvesting”); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972) (“Nowhere 
in the pleadings or affidavits did the Club state that its members use Mineral King for any 
purpose, much less that they use it in any way that would be significantly affected by the 
proposed actions of the respondents.” (footnote omitted)). 
 223. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 
UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1359–61 (2000); Joanna B. Wymyslo, Standing for Endangered 
Species: Justiciability Beyond Humanity, 15 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 59–65 (2007). 
 224. See Preston Carter, Note, “If an (Endangered) Tree Falls in the Forest, and No One 
Is Around . . . .”: Resolving the Divergence Between Standing Requirements and 
Congressional Intent in Environmental Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2191, 2222–36 
(2009); Cormac Cullinan, Do Humans Have Standing to Deny Trees Rights?, 11 BARRY L. 
REV. 11 (2008).  
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published his pathmarking article, “Should Trees Have Standing?”225 Justice 
Douglas would have adopted Stone’s argument as the law of land, promoting 
standing for “valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, 
groves of trees, swampland, or even air.”226 
This is not as controversial as it sounds. Not only do we recognize standing for 
humans who cannot speak for themselves (for example, those whose mental 
condition makes them incompetent to handle their own affairs, or those who are not 
old enough to be legally recognized),227 but we also recognize collectives of 
humans (corporations, for example) as legal persons.228 We even recognize ships as 
juridical persons.229 And we have a clear mechanism for the participation of such 
entities in court: if they cannot represent themselves, they can be represented by 
others.230 
So it would not actually be very hard, legally, to recognize embryos as persons 
for purposes of standing. Just as environmental plaintiffs argue that animals and 
trees should have standing, pro-life litigants argue that embryos themselves should 
have standing. To be sure, and especially to the extent that fetuses are treated the 
same as ex utero embryos, the proposal raises especially controversial issues, with 
implications not only for stem cell research and embryonic adoption but also for 
abortion, drug use by pregnant women, and fetal medical therapy.231 
Particularly interesting in this context is Justice Scalia’s perspective. He almost 
certainly would not agree with the idea of recognizing the standing of “valleys, 
alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 225. See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972); see also CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD 
TREES HAVE STANDING?: LAW, MORALITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (3d ed. 2010). 
 226. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 742–43 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 227. See STONE, supra note 225, at 1 (the law has come to recognize, “albeit imperfectly 
some would say,” the personhood of children, “prisoners, aliens, women (especially of the 
married variety), the insane, African Americans, fetuses, and Native Americans” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 228. See id. at 1–2; see also Sunstein, supra note 223, at 1360–61 (explaining that 
Congress has conferred legal rights on corporations, trusts, and municipalities). 
 229. See STONE, supra note 225, at 1–2 (citing United States v. Cargo of the Brig Malek 
Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 234 (1844) (“This is not a proceeding against the owner; it is a 
proceeding against the vessel for an offense committed by the vessel; which is not the less an 
offense . . . because it was committed without the authority and against the will of the 
owner.” (quotation marks omitted)); see also Sunstein, supra note 223, at 1360–61 (ships as 
legal persons). 
 230. See STONE, supra note 225, at 1–2; see also Sunstein, supra note 223, at 1359. 
 231. Compare, e.g., Susan Goldberg, Of Gametes and Guardians: The Impropriety of 
Appointing Guardians Ad Litem for Fetuses and Embryos, 66 WASH. L. REV. 503, 504 
(1991) (“Because a fetus is physically dependent upon and resides within the woman 
carrying it, according such entities independent legal rights threatens the privacy and 
autonomy of pregnant women.”), with Sam S. Bails, Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The 
Need To Provide Legal Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1230 (1987) (“[A] 
guardian ad liter can evaluate the risks to the fetus from the mother’s conduct, the benefit 
from any intervention, and the risks to the mother from the intervention.”). 
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swampland, or even air.”232 His view on the standing of animals is, as far as I can 
discover, unknown. As far as the standing of embryos and fetuses, he has stated that 
their personhood is not resolved by the Constitution itself,233 but commentators 
suggest he would be receptive if Congress recognized fetuses and/or embryos as 
legal persons.234 
III. A WINDOW TO REFORM STANDING? 
In this Part, I discuss the desirability of granting standing in these conservative 
impact lawsuits and assess the likelihood that the Court will seize on these 
conservative cases (or on congressional enactments prompted by them) to reform 
standing doctrine. 
A. Do These Cases Present a Strange-Bedfellows Moment? 
These cases might prompt some liberal schadenfreude: “[W]e’ve suffered under 
this doctrine for years, and now, to our delight, you are suffering, too.” Certainly 
the news coverage of these issues has sometimes had such a tone.235 Perhaps these 
cases provide a reason for liberals to begin to support the current, restrictive 
standing doctrine. Remember that standing’s recent role as a barrier to liberal 
public-interest litigation was preceded by a period in which progressive causes were 
protected by standing doctrine. In the 1930s and 1940s, standing protected 
President Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation from the pro-business federal courts.236 
Now add to this history the fact that the federal courts are now vastly more 
conservative than they were in the 1960s and 1970s.237 Some on the left are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 232. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 743 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also 
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 98 n.3 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the idea 
that trees have rights as “druidical”).  
 233. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 982 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The whole argument of abortion opponents is 
that what the Court calls the fetus and what others call the unborn child is a human life. 
Thus, whatever answer Roe came up with after conducting its ‘balancing’ is bound to be 
wrong, unless it is correct that the human fetus is in some critical sense merely potentially 
human. There is of course no way to determine that as a legal matter; it is in fact a value 
judgment. Some societies have considered newborn children not yet human, or the 
incompetent elderly no longer so.” (emphasis in original) (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973)). 
 234. Keith S. Alexander, Federalism, Abortion, and the Original Meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Power: Can Congress Ban Partial-Birth Abortion 
After Carhart?, 13 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 105 (2008); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial 
Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1322 n.310 (2007). 
 235. Greenhouse, supra note 16. 
 236. See Ho & Ross, supra note 39, at 639–44; Sunstein, supra note 39, at 179–81; 
Winter, supra note 5, at 1456. 
 237. See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in 
Historical Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875, 879–80 (2008) (“The Supreme Court’s 
increasingly prominent conservative center of gravity coincides with an overwhelmingly 
conservative set of federal courts of appeals.”); Charles H. Whitebread, The 2005-2006 Term 
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concerned that we have entered a new age of conservative jurisprudence.238 The gay 
marriage, health care, and stem cell research cases suggest that the doctrine can play 
a liberal role again, by closing the door of the courts to conservative plaintiffs (and 
thus preventing judgments for those plaintiffs on the merits).  
Of course, this very fact may lead to changes in the doctrine. Professor Stearns 
has suggested that, if the federal courts become safely conservative, standing 
doctrine may expand to allow more lawsuits: “Over time, an increasingly 
conservative Roberts Court will seek to relax the strictest features of standing 
doctrine to facilitate its broader doctrinal agenda.”239 However, as Professor Stearns 
himself notes (writing before the 2008 presidential election), “historical events 
could certainly overtake the predictive thesis on the future direction of standing 
doctrine, assuming for example that a Democrat is elected President in 2008.”240 
Since President Obama, rather than a Republican, was elected, the entrenchment of 
a conservative Supreme Court has been at least delayed: recent appointees, Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan, have kept the seats of Justices Stevens and Souter occupied 
by liberals.241 
Nevertheless, Professor Stearns points in an interesting direction. Are liberals 
right to continue to fight for expanded standing doctrine, if the courts have become 
increasingly hostile to liberal causes?242 It is my view that expanded standing 
doctrine is still the right answer. Given the ample and convincing criticisms of 
current standing doctrine,243 and given the widespread arguments for opening the 
federal courts to more plaintiffs, only the most naked political calculation could 
lead liberals to argue that standing doctrine is properly applied to conservative 
impact lawsuits but not to lawsuits involving environmental and consumer 
protection, civil rights, and the like.  
One might thus see these cases as a strange-bedfellows opportunity to persuade a 
majority of the Court to alter existing standing doctrine. Liberal members of the 
Court generally advocate for a more expansive doctrine of standing; conservative 
members of the Court usually support restrictive standing doctrine, but their interest 
in reaching the merits of certain cases may lead them to agree to certain reforms. 
Together, liberal and conservative strange bedfellows could cure some of the 
problems of standing doctrine. 
                                                                                                                 
of the United States Supreme Court: A Court in Transition, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 6 
(2006); Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court; the Most Conservative Court in Decades, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 25, 2010, at A1. 
 238. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291, 292 (2005) 
(“I’ve suspended work on a revision [of my constitutional law treatise] because . . . conflict 
over basic constitutional premises is today at a fever pitch [due to recent conservative 
decisions].”). 
 239. Stearns, supra note 237, at 880. 
 240. Id. at 882. 
 241. Joan Biskupic, Rookies on Bench May Recast Liberal Wing: “Dynamic” Duo of 
Kagan and Sotomayor Are Adding a Forceful Style of One-Upmanship and Vigor to 
Supreme Court, USA TODAY, Mar. 4, 2011, at A9. 
 242. See supra notes 222–26 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra Part I.B. 
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B. Will the Court Take the Opportunity? 
First, note that the Court has recently declined the opportunity to address 
standing in the health-care cases by granting certiorari in the one case where 
standing was conceded by all parties.244 This is no great loss, as most of the 
standing issues in these cases are garden variety: individual injury, imminence, and 
generalized grievances.245 But the Court has avoided the complicated and 
interesting standing issue raised by Virginia’s suit in her sovereign capacity.246 
 If the Court decides to grant certiorari in the gay marriage or stem cell areas, it 
must address not only standing doctrine but also (if standing is found) the merits of 
the underlying cases. The merits of these cases will almost certainly divide the 
Court along predictable political lines. If the four liberals—Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—line up on one side on the merits of gay marriage 
or stem cell research, and the four conservatives—Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—line up on the other, Justice Kennedy will be 
the deciding vote.247 Thus, even if four Justices would otherwise vote to grant the 
writ of certiorari,248 serious doubt about Justice Kennedy’s merits vote249 could 
prevent grant of the writ: no coalition of four justices would risk granting, given the 
possibility that Kennedy would join the other four on the merits. 
The stem cell cases are unlikely to lead to important standing decisions. After 
all, they may provide only opportunities for the application of ordinary standing 
doctrine. The Sherley v. Sebelius case, if taken on certiorari, would be at least as 
likely to be reversed for its standing holding based on competitive injury.250 And 
the Doe v. Obama case, involving suit by the class of embryos that might be 
donated for research, relied on Roe v. Wade for its determination that the embryos 
were not legal persons.  
At the same time, however, the stem cell cases offer an interesting parallel to 
certain forms of environmental standing.251 Would liberal justices, tempted by the 
opportunity to expand environmental standing, make common cause with 
conservative justices, intent on providing more protection to embryos? This 
outcome is extremely unlikely, due primarily to the piecemeal approach to juridical 
personhood. The Court would not make a sweeping proclamation that all entities 
meeting a certain test were juridical persons; instead, it would (at most) find 
standing for the entity at issue in the particular case, and the Court is more likely 
                                                                                                                 
 
 244.  Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 
2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011). 
 245.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 246.  See supra notes 178–99 and accompanying text. 
 247.  See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 18; Murchison, supra note 18. 
 248.  See supra note 19. 
 249.  See supra note 20. 
 250. See supra notes 193–202 and accompanying text (noting that one researcher 
challenging the expansion of stem cell-research funding, and basing standing on the 
competitive injury she suffered in competing for NIH grants, had received funding and thus 
was not harmed by the regulation, and that the other researcher had never even applied for 
NIH funding). 
 251. See supra notes 206–10 and accompanying text. 
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instead to leave the question for Congress’s determination. Thus the stem 
cell-research cases do not make for the kind of strange-bedfellows alliance that 
might create change in the Court’s Article III standing doctrine. It is conceivable 
that four justices could vote to grant certiorari in the Doe v. Obama case (or one 
like it), hoping to chip away at Roe’s view of the embryo and fetus without inviting 
the political firestorm that a more direct attack on the right to abortion would invite, 
but to gain a five-vote majority would be difficult: Justice Kennedy, while he joined 
the majority in striking down partial-birth abortion,252 and has taken a more lenient 
view of restrictions on abortion than pro-choice advocates have wished,253 has never 
abandoned his support for the right to abortion.254 
The most likely prospect for standing evolution is the gay-marriage case. If the 
Ninth Circuit rejects the appeal because the Prop 8 proponents lack standing, would 
the Supreme Court take the case? The Justices who support the narrow view of 
standing—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito255—also 
(by all accounts) oppose gay marriage.256 The Justices who support broad 
standing—Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—are believed to 
support gay marriage.  
It is widely expected that Justice Kennedy would join the liberal wing of the 
Court in a case raising the gay marriage issue.257 But Justice Kennedy has gone 
back and forth on the standing issue.258 It is thus possible that the Court would find 
standing for the Proponents and address the gay-marriage issue on the merits, 
without making any wholesale changes in standing doctrine. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 252. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 253. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 956 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 254. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 255. See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 298 (2008) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito). 
 256. See, e.g., Toni Lester, Adam and Steve vs. Adam and Eve: Will the New Supreme 
Court Grant Gays the Right to Marry?, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 253, 297–98, 
303–08 (2006) (discussing established anti-gay-marriage views of Justices Scalia and 
Thomas and probable anti-gay-marriage views of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito). 
 257. Justice Kennedy is noted for his divergence from the conservative justices on gay 
issues. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Two 
Cheers for State Constitutional Law, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1704 (2010). I am assuming, as 
does Dean Chemerinsky, that Justices Sotomayor and Kagan would join Justices Ginsburg 
and Breyer in forming four votes in favor of gay marriage. Id. at 1708. 
 258. It is possible, for example, that the Court’s out-of-place argument regarding state 
sovereignty in Massachusetts v. EPA, see supra notes 181 and accompanying text, was 
included to obtain Justice Kennedy’s vote for the majority opinion. Bradford Mank, Should 
States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New 
Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701, 1738 (2008); Gillian E. Metzger, 
Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2039 (2008). And Justice 
Kennedy has not been clear in his view on Congress’s authority to find standing by statute. 
See Elliott, supra note 22, at 193–94. 
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C. Could Congress Force the Issue? 
Congress has sometimes taken steps to endow particular parties with 
standing.259As I have recently argued, Congress’s power in this respect is limited.260 
While the Court has stated that “the question whether the litigant is a ‘proper party 
to request an adjudication of a particular issue’ is one within the power of Congress 
to determine,”261 the Court has emphasized that Article III may not be altered by 
statute.262 
                                                                                                                 
 
 259. See Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 1023, 1052–54 (2009) (noting a few bills that would have provided 
standing “wholesale” and a number of statutes that create private causes of action “retail”).  
  As I have recently discussed, see Elliott, supra note 22, at 184–85, an early draft of 
the 2010 climate-change bill would have allowed suit by “any person who has suffered, or 
reasonably expects to suffer, a harm attributable, in whole or in part, to a violation or failure 
to act” under the statute; the draft defined harm to “include[] any effect of air pollution 
(including climate change), currently occurring or at risk of occurring, and the incremental 
exacerbation of any such effect or risk that is associated with a small incremental emission of 
any air pollutant . . . , whether or not the effect or risk is widely shared.” See Discussion 
Draft, American Clean Energy & Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 336(a) 
(2009), at 527–28, available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/ 
Press_111/20090331/acesa_ discussiondraft.pdf (draft bill, never adopted in this form, 
providing broadened standing for climate-change issues). Moreover, the draft defined 
causation very broadly:  
an effect or risk associated with any air pollutant . . . shall be considered 
attributable to the violation or failure to act concerned if the violation or failure 
to act slows the pace of implementation of this Act or compliance with this Act 
or results in any emission of greenhouse gas or other air pollutant at a higher 
level than would have been emitted in the absence of the violation or failure to 
act.  
Id. Later drafts abandoned this standing provision, see American Clean Energy and Security 
Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 336 (as introduced in House, May 15, 2009).  
  The quoted language would have tried to change existing standing doctrine by 
expanding both injury in fact and causation. Injury in fact is expanded to include not only 
current effects of air pollution, but also risks of air pollution and incremental increases in 
such risk, even if not “imminent,” which current doctrine requires, see, e.g., Summers v. 
Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148 (2009), and even if the risk is minuscule, compare 
Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003), with Ctr for Law and Educ. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and Shain v. Veneman, 376 F.3d 815, 
818 (8th Cir. 2004). This provision of the climate-change bill would also have defined 
causation much more broadly than the Court has.  
 260. Elliott, supra note 22, at 182–94; see also Pushaw, supra note 26, at 6 (“Congress’s 
judgments about standing are entitled not to blind obedience but rather to healthy deference. 
Under my revised approach, courts generally would implement statutory grants of standing, 
except in rare circumstances where doing so would require them to exceed the bounds of 
their Article III ‘judicial Power’ to decide ‘Cases’ (i.e., actions in which plaintiffs credibly 
allege that their legal rights have been violated involuntarily because of a fortuitous event 
beyond their control).” (internal cross-reference omitted)). 
 261. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968)); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 
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Congress could nevertheless pass a statute that it knows would fail under the 
Court’s current interpretation of Article III. Legislators, knowing that a statute is 
unconstitutional under current doctrine, may nevertheless vote for that statute, 
assuming that the courts will correct any constitutional infirmities or, perhaps, 
hoping to encourage the courts to change the law.263 A Congress that wished to push 
the Court to confront standing’s flaws might therefore enact a law conferring broad 
standing, even though legislators expect pushback from the Court. 
And if the Court agrees with what Congress says,264 then a statute might give the 
Court welcome support. It is quite possible that the current activist House of 
Representatives could pass a statute conferring standing on conservative 
plaintiffs—or, as I have noted above, even on embryos and/or fetuses.265 Assuming 
for the moment that such a statute would be approved by the Senate and signed into 
law by President Obama—unlikely, at best—would the Court accept or reject? 
The answer here departs from what one might expect, based on the merits of the 
underlying case. Several members of the Court have asserted their view that control 
of standing is Congress’s to begin with: Justices Ginsburg and Breyer are likely to 
defer to Congress on the standing issue;266 we do not know much about what 
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan would do, but if they follow liberal patterns, they are 
likely also to defer to Congress. Thus it would require only one Justice—Justice 
Kennedy, perhaps, or one of the Justices who have articulated strict limits on 
                                                                                                                 
(1975) (“The actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of 
‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.’” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973))). 
 262. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009) (“[T]he requirement of 
injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.”); 
id. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This case would present different considerations if 
Congress had sought to provide redress for a concrete injury giv[ing] rise to a case or 
controversy where none existed before.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); 
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997) (“It is settled that Congress cannot erase 
Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who 
would not otherwise have standing.”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578, 
(1992) (stating that Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries 
concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” (emphasis added)); 
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (“In no event . . . may 
Congress abrogate the Art. III minima . . . .”). But see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation 
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Constitution, 89 B.U. L. REV. 499, 504 (2009). 
 264. See Elliott, supra note 22, at 193 (“Congress would not always lose: it could enact a 
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(emphasis in original). 
 265. See supra notes 218–21 and accompanying text. 
 266. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 191 (2000). 
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Congress’s authority to grant standing267—to accept a congressional statute 
converting, for example, embryos into juridical persons. This analysis, of course, 
assumes that the liberal justices would follow their usual views of standing, even if 
the ensuing litigation would be unpalatable to those justices on the merits. 
IV. WHAT WOULD (SHOULD) THE COURT DO? 
Given this strange-bedfellows moment, what might the Court actually do to 
standing doctrine? In this Part, I use the lens of the conservative standing issue to 
evaluate recent suggestions for amending the doctrine. I then turn to the doctrine 
more generally. 
A. Recent Proposals in Light of Conservative Standing Problems 
Does the emergence of significant standing problems for conservative impact 
litigation enlighten us regarding recent standing proposals? After all, if most 
criticisms of standing doctrine have come from the left (and most defenses from the 
right), then these recent cases present standing in a very different context. They thus 
present a helpful lens through which to analyze suggestions for revising the 
doctrine.  
1. Pushaw’s “Accidental Standing” Theory 
Professor Pushaw has recently published a suggestion for refining standing 
doctrine268 that expands on (and alters) his scholarship defining “cases” and 
“controversies.”269 In 1994, Pushaw argued for a “reformulat[ion]” of justiciability 
doctrines such as standing, one that took into account the historical difference in 
meaning between cases and controversies. Controversies, he argued, were 
traditional bilateral disputes over which judges were to act merely as umpires; 
justiciability doctrines make sense in that context—if you are going to umpire a 
dispute, you need to know that a dispute exists.270 But “cases” were a different 
animal: they were “a formal cause of action demanding a remedy for the claimed 
violation of a legal right,”271 requiring the court to answer “a legal question that 
transcended the interests of the immediate litigants,”272 and (given Article III’s text) 
asking the federal courts to expound upon law when federal questions, admiralty, or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 267. See Elliott, supra note 22, at 193. 
 268. Pushaw, supra note 26. 
 269. Pushaw, Case/Controversy Distinction, supra note 25. 
 270. Id. at 519–20. Pushaw further argues that the federal courts in diversity 
controversies and state-vs.-non-citizen controversies should consider whether federal 
jurisdiction is even warranted, given the availability of alternative state or administrative 
fore, id. at 520–21, something that goes well beyond current Article III justiciability 
doctrines.  
 271. Id. at 472. 
 272. Id. at 480 (footnote omitted). 
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foreign ministers were involved.273 The key to a case is the need for legal exposition 
from a federal court274 and the absence of any need for a concrete dispute.275 
In this new piece, he adds a new wrinkle to the analysis of “case,” 
noting that the “original meaning of the word ‘case’ [was] a chance occurrence that 
invades someone’s individual legal rights and thereby gives rise to a cause of 
action, in which a court's chief function is to expound the law.”276 Thus, he argues, 
the right plaintiff, under Article III’s “Case” provision, is “one whose federal legal 
rights have been violated fortuitously (that is, involuntarily as a result of a 
happenstance event or action beyond the plaintiff’s control) and who can therefore 
legitimately trigger the court’s expository function.”277 This is quite different from 
the 1994 article, which would have had the federal courts accept any “case” that had 
a clearly framed federal issue, with “quality lawyering” and “a well-developed 
factual record”;278 indeed, Pushaw noted, “public law ‘Cases’ . . . traditionally could 
be brought by any citizen.”279 
Pushaw’s goal in Accidental Standing is to keep out of the federal courts cases 
that have been manufactured by would-be plaintiffs. Thus, under his test, standing is 
satisfied “only when it befalls a plaintiff by chance.”280 This would leave the 
standing of private-law plaintiffs and regulated entities largely undisturbed: “This 
sort of injury virtually always exists when the violation of a federal law results in a 
tort, breach of contract, or infringement of property rights.”281 
What does accidental standing do to regulatory beneficiaries? Pushaw 
recognizes that “the Court will not overrule its precedent recognizing environmental 
and ‘aesthetic’ injuries.”282 But plaintiffs claiming such injuries should have to 
rebut the presumption that they lack the kind of “fortuitous” injury that (Pushaw 
argues) the word “case” requires: 
Those latter plaintiffs should be able to rebut that presumption only by 
demonstrating that they suffered distinctive injuries that occurred 
fortuitously while they were engaging in lawful recreational activity for 
its own sake—for example, that they visited a national park one day for 
pleasure and unexpectedly saw illegal conduct that harmed them in a 
special way. By contrast, standing should be denied to those who, either 
on their own or at the instigation of a special interest group, go 
somewhere specifically to look for legal violations to use as a basis to 
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 276. Pushaw, supra note 26, at 11 (emphasis added); see also MAXWELL L. STEARNS, 
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 279. Id. at 530. 
 280. Pushaw, supra note 26, at 12. 
 281. Id. 
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file a complaint. Such self-inflicted injuries should be treated as a 
species of feigned claims, which have long been barred.283 
Note that one might construe this approach as taking Lujan’s distinction between 
regulated entities and regulatory beneficiaries284 and making it more concretely 
operative. Those who bring classic “private law” suits285 and those who are 
burdened by regulatory action have “cases,” understood as accidental happenings, 
while those who benefit from a law and seek to enforce it presumptively do not 
have “cases.”286 
Whether a plaintiff can overcome that presumption depends of course on the 
facts and the law at issue. A plaintiff seeking to enforce the Clean Air Act287 might 
easily meet Pushaw’s test: breathing contaminated air is presumably the fortuitous 
incident that Pushaw would require; drinking polluted water, ditto. A plaintiff 
seeking instead to enforce a provision of the Federal Land Management and Policy 
Act288 regarding sales of forest land, on the other hand, would have a hard time: the 
chances that the plaintiff happened along when the law was being violated are slim 
to none. 
Pushaw’s theory, then, recognizes the standing of plaintiffs whose injuries look 
most like private law injuries.289 That overlap means that Pushaw’s standing theory 
would reinforce the narrow doctrine that obtains in current doctrine: the federal 
courts are for those with private-law claims or for those burdened by what someone 
else did to them, not for those burdened by the government’s failure to make 
someone else do something.290 But that fit with the accepted wisdom, while perhaps 
reinforcing the standing issues arising in challenges to the PPACA,291 makes 
Pushaw’s suggestion unhelpful for the conservative plaintiffs in the gay marriage 
and stem cell cases. Those plaintiffs, precisely because they are analytically similar 
                                                                                                                 
 
 283. Id. at 12–13. 
[T]he presumption . . . should not be rebuttable merely by a plaintiff's assertion 
that she subjectively felt injured by a defendant’s alleged legal violations. 
Rather, the judicial inquiry should be whether a reasonable person in her 
situation would have experienced an injury so significant that she would have 
been motivated to sue. Such an objective test would avoid rewarding 
hypersensitive plaintiffs. 
Id. at 13 (footnote omitted). 
 284. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 285. See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL 
L. REV. 275, 323 (2008). 
 286. Pushaw, supra note 26, at 12–13. 
 287. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006). 
 288. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1782. 
 289. Pollution, after all, was handled under the law of nuisance before state and federal 
statutory regimes existed. E.g., Denise E. Antolini & Clifford L. Rechtschaffen, Common 
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 290. See supra Part I.B. 
 291. See supra Part II.B (describing health care lawsuits as fairly typical standing cases). 
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to the environmental plaintiffs Pushaw would keep out of the courts, cannot satisfy 
the “accidental” standing theory. 
2. Nash’s Precautionary Standing 
Another recent suggestion arose in the context of environmental law but would 
potentially address stem cell litigation. Jonathan Remy Nash has recently argued 
that certain issues involve harms that are “uncertain but . . . potential[ly] . . . large 
and irreversible.”292 He draws on international law’s precautionary principle: “The 
precautionary principle addresses situations such as this and explains that the 
absence of certainty in the face of a large risk does not justify inaction.”293 Thus, he 
argues for “precautionary-based standing” for “cases in which it can be shown that 
there is uncertainty as to whether irreversible and catastrophic harms may occur.”294 
Nash’s suggestion was prompted by Massachusetts v. EPA,295 where a majority 
of the Court found standing for Massachusetts to challenge EPA’s failure to 
regulate greenhouse gases.296 In that case, the dissent contended that the science 
regarding global climate change was uncertain, so that Massachusetts could not 
meet any of the requirements of the standing test: it could not show it was being or 
would be harmed by global climate change, nor could it show that EPA’s failure to 
regulate caused any such harm or that EPA’s regulation would redress that harm.297 
The majority relied on EPA’s concession that global climate change was occurring 
and was caused by human activity.298 
But what would the Court have done, Nash asks, if it had been clear to everyone 
that the science was, in fact, uncertain?299 Would standing be lacking because of the 
scientific uncertainty, even though the potential consequences of global climate 
change are catastrophic and irreversible?300 Nash suggests that this would be the 
wrong outcome, since a risk of catastrophic and irreversible harm (even if 
uncertain) creates the kind of “case or controversy” that should be heard in the 
federal courts.301  
Thus, Nash argues, “the ‘injury’ prong of standing is satisfied where the plaintiff 
can show that the harm that it might suffer would be catastrophic and irreversible, 
and that its occurrence is subject to great uncertainty.”302 The theory, if adopted, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 292. Nash, supra note 27, at 495. 
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would obviously provide a good justification for standing to sue in many 
environmental law cases. 
To the extent that stem cell research raises similar concerns, Nash’s proposal 
might also be helpful to conservative plaintiffs. Indeed, it has been suggested that 
the precautionary principle provides a useful metric for evaluating technologies 
such as stem cell therapies.303 The European Group on Ethics used the 
precautionary principle to recommend against the creation of embryos solely for 
research.304 Those seeking federal court review of the Obama Administration’s 
expansion of human embryonic stem cell research might well invoke Nash’s 
suggestion for standing based on the precautionary principle. 
 
*** 
 
In the end, then, Pushaw’s accidental standing theory appears most likely to 
reinforce existing narrow standing in a way unhelpful to either liberal or 
conservative plaintiffs. Nash’s argument for standing based on the precautionary 
principle might provide a useful expansion of standing for both liberal and 
conservative plaintiffs litigating in areas of scientific uncertainty. 
B. Specific Changes in the Doctrine 
As should now be familiar, the tripartite test of injury in fact, causation, and 
redressability is the “bedrock requirement” of constitutional standing.305 What 
changes to those three parts would emerge if the Court seized the moment presented 
by these conservative cases? 
First, even if the Court tinkered with the elements of the tripartite test, it would 
seem to have an uphill climb finding standing for the anti-gay-marriage Proponents 
in the California case. The Court has long precluded litigation by those who litigate 
only to vindicate their value interests; it has kept such litigants out of the courts not 
only using the injury in fact limitation306 but also (before that test became the 
standard) using limitations on the litigation of generalized grievances307 or on 
taxpayer standing.308 Even though, as Professor Karlan has recently written, a 
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portion of the Court fears that “supporters of traditional marriage are at substantial 
risk of unfair treatment and therefore deserving of special judicial solicitude,”309 I 
cannot see a way to change the current standing test to allow the Proponents into 
court. 
As I have already noted,310 the healthcare cases actually involve run-of-the-mill 
standing. Some plaintiffs suing to challenge PPACA have standing under the 
ordinary test, some do not. As already noted, the Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari in a case where the plaintiffs properly argued standing, without any need 
for change in the doctrine. 
The most interesting possibility is raised by the stem cell cases. Those plaintiffs 
face problems very like those faced by plaintiffs in many environmental lawsuits 
involving endangered species or ecosystems. Just as the environmental plaintiffs sue 
to protect the endangered species or the ecosystem, the stem cell opponents sue to 
protect embryos. But species, ecosystems, and embryos are not legal persons who 
can suffer cognizable harm, and they thus lack standing, forcing the environmental 
plaintiff or stem cell opponent to argue her own standing.311 The Court could 
therefore recognize these entities as persons for purposes of standing, a move that 
would dramatically alter access to the federal courts under standing doctrine 
without much alteration of the doctrine itself. Such a move would, however, be 
extremely controversial, especially to the extent that fetuses are treated the same as 
ex utero embryos, raising implications for stem cell research, embryonic adoption, 
abortion, drug use by pregnant women, and fetal medical therapy.312 
 
*** 
 
On this evaluation, the Court appears to face three wholly different cases: one in 
which mere alterations to the doctrine cannot help; one in which no alterations will 
be needed; and one in which alterations, while simple, will raise tremendous 
complications. Is there another option? 
C. A Renewed Call for De-Constitutionalizing Standing 
I have previously argued that the Article III-grounded standing doctrine should 
be converted to “a prudential abstention doctrine” that allows the federal courts to 
“explicitly confront the separation-of-powers issues [they] now address[] implicitly 
(and confusingly) through standing analysis.”313 The need for this change in 
standing doctrine is highlighted by the gay-marriage case in California.  
As I described above,314 the Prop 8 case raises the possibility that a federal judge 
will have declared a ballot initiative—the product of a direct democratic vote—
unconstitutional, with no review by a higher court, because the government bound 
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by the ballot initiative has refused to defend it. That refusal might be justified by the 
unconstitutionality of the ballot initiative, but it might also be an unjustified effort 
to avoid following the democratic will. How are we to determine whether the 
democratic will is being improperly thwarted or properly reined in? The older 
Baker v. Carr requirement for standing is more than satisfied here: “the appellants 
allege[] such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that 
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the 
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”315 
At the same time, the Prop 8 case arises in the larger context of civil rights 
litigation, where “courts should be careful to maintain access for those who cannot 
expect a fair hearing from the political branches.”316 It is, of course, the gay 
plaintiffs who are the victims of the political branches here; they won at the district 
court level, and perhaps that should be the end of it. The Proponents seem to have 
at best a “generalized grievance” of the type spurned by the courts for decades, and 
so even under a prudential abstention doctrine the Court might refuse to hear their 
case. A prudential abstention doctrine might also help the Court manage the stem 
cell cases by giving some flexibility for dealing with resulting controversies. 
These facts merely underline the need for the changes I have advocated 
elsewhere.317 The decision whether or not to allow the case to proceed to the higher 
courts is poorly addressed by the tripartite standing test; the question is multi-
faceted and troubling, and raises a number of prudential rather than constitutional 
issues.  
CONCLUSION 
As I have shown, the Supreme Court’s Article III standing doctrine is now an 
equal-opportunity litigation blocker: both left-wing and right-wing plaintiffs have 
felt its bite. What do these cases teach us about standing doctrine? One might 
respond that, if standing doctrine works to keep those issues out of the courts, it is 
not as bad as many have thought. It should be remembered, however, that the very 
manipulability of the doctrine means that, even though certain conservative litigants 
are currently losing under standing doctrine, those barriers cannot be relied on. 
Nor should they be. These new cases instead present opportunities for the Court 
to alter existing doctrine in ways long argued for by liberals: the courts should be 
more broadly accessible, and the strange-bedfellows moment presented by these 
cases might cause the Court to grant that access. Unfortunately, that moment may 
not produce the desired changes. 
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